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Part 1 
Overview: 
Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook
Amid a severe global economic downturn, the U.S. 
economy contracted further and labor market conditions 
worsened over the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. In the early part 
of the year, economic activity deteriorated sharply, and 
strains in ﬁ  nancial markets and pressures on ﬁ  nancial 
institutions generally intensiﬁ  ed. More recently, how-
ever, the downturn in economic activity appears to be 
abating and ﬁ  nancial conditions have eased somewhat, 
developments that partly reﬂ  ect the broad range of 
policy actions that have been taken to address the crisis. 
Nonetheless, credit conditions for many households and 
businesses remain tight, and ﬁ  nancial markets are still 
stressed. In the labor market, employment declines have 
remained sizable—although the pace of job loss has 
diminished somewhat from earlier in the year—and the 
unemployment rate has continued to climb. Meanwhile, 
consumer price inﬂ  ation has remained subdued.
  U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) fell sharply 
again in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, but the contraction in 
overall output looks to have moderated somewhat of 
late. Consumer spending—which has been supported 
recently by the boost to disposable income from the tax 
cuts and increases in various beneﬁ  t payments that were 
implemented as part of the 2009 ﬁ  scal stimulus pack-
age—appears to be holding reasonably steady so far 
this year. And consumer sentiment is up from the his-
torical lows recorded around the turn of the year. In the 
housing market, a leveling out of home sales and con-
struction activity in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 suggests that 
the demand for new houses may be stabilizing follow-
ing three years of steep declines. Businesses, however, 
have continued to cut capital spending and liquidate 
inventories in response to soft demand and excessive 
stocks. Economic activity abroad plummeted in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter and has continued to fall, albeit more slowly, in 
recent months. Slumping foreign demand led to a sharp 
drop in U.S. exports during the ﬁ  rst half of the year. 
However, the ongoing contraction in U.S. domestic 
demand triggered an even sharper drop in imports. 
  The further contraction in domestic economic activ-
ity during the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 was accompanied by 
a signiﬁ  cant deterioration in labor market conditions. 
Private-sector payroll employment fell at an average 
monthly rate of 670,000 jobs in the ﬁ  rst four months of 
this year before declining by 312,000 jobs in May and 
415,000 jobs in June. Meanwhile, the unemployment 
rate moved up steadily from 7¼ percent at the turn of 
the year to 9½ percent in June. With the sharp reduc-
tions in employment, the wage and salary incomes of 
households, adjusted for price changes, fell during this 
period.
  Overall consumer price inﬂ  ation, which slowed 
sharply late last year, remained subdued in the ﬁ  rst half 
of this year as the margin of slack in labor and product 
markets widened considerably further and as prices of 
oil and other commodities retraced only a part of their 
earlier steep declines. All told, the 12-month change 
in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price 
index was close to zero in May, while the 12-month 
change in PCE prices excluding food and energy was 
1¾ percent. Survey measures of longer-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations have remained relatively stable this year 
and currently stand at about their average values in 
2008. 
 During  the  ﬁ  rst few months of 2009, pressures on 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, which had eased late last year, intensi-
ﬁ  ed again. Equity prices of banks and insurance com-
panies fell amid reports of large losses in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, and market-based measures of the 
likelihood of default by those institutions rose. Broad 
equity price indexes also fell in the United States and 
abroad, and measures of volatility in such markets 
stayed at near-record levels. In addition, bank funding 
markets were strained, ﬂ  ows of credit to businesses 
and households were impaired, and many securitization 
markets remained shut.
  The Federal Reserve and other government enti-
ties continued to respond forcefully to these adverse 
ﬁ  nancial market developments. The Federal Reserve 
kept its target for the federal funds rate at a range 
between 0 and ¼ percent and purchased additional 
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency 
debt. Throughout the ﬁ  rst half of the year, the Federal 
Reserve also continued to provide funding to ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and markets through a variety of credit and 
liquidity facilities. In February, the Treasury, the Feder- Note: A list of abbreviations is available at the end of this report.2  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
al Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
Ofﬁ  ce of Thrift Supervision announced the Financial 
Stability Plan. The plan included, among other ele-
ments, a Capital Assistance Program designed to assess 
the capital needs of banking institutions under a range 
of economic scenarios (through the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP), or stress test) and, if nec-
essary, to assist banking institutions in strengthening the 
amount and quality of their capital. In early March, the 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury launched the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), an ini-
tiative designed to catalyze the securitization markets 
by providing ﬁ  nancing to investors to support their 
purchases of certain AAA-rated asset-backed securi-
ties. At the March meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), the Committee decided to expand 
its purchases of agency MBS and agency debt and to 
begin buying longer-term Treasury securities to help 
improve conditions in private credit markets. In May, 
the Federal Reserve announced an expansion of eligible 
collateral under the TALF program. In the same month, 
the results of the SCAP were announced and were posi-
tively received in ﬁ  nancial markets. 
  These policy actions, and ones previously taken, 
have helped stabilize a number of ﬁ  nancial markets 
and, in some cases, have led to signiﬁ  cant improve-
ments. In recent months, strains in short-term funding 
markets have eased, with some credit spreads in those 
markets returning close to pre-crisis levels. The narrow-
ing in spreads likely reﬂ  ects, in part, a decrease in the 
probability that market participants assign to extremely 
adverse outcomes for the economy in light of the appar-
ent moderation in the rate of economic contraction. 
Global equity prices have recouped some of their earlier 
declines, and measures of volatility in equity and other 
ﬁ  nancial markets have retreated somewhat, though they 
remain at elevated levels. Issuance in some securitiza-
tion markets that were essentially shut down earlier 
has begun to increase. Although yields on longer-term 
Treasury securities have risen, some of these increases 
are likely attributable to improvement in the economic 
outlook and a reversal in ﬂ  ight-to-quality ﬂ  ows. Mort-
gage rates have risen about in line with Treasury yields, 
but corporate bond yields have continued to decline. 
By early June, the 10 banking organizations required 
by the SCAP to bolster their capital buffers had issued 
new common equity in amounts that either met or came 
close to meeting the SCAP requirements. Nonetheless, 
despite these notable improvements, strains remain 
in most ﬁ  nancial markets, many ﬁ  nancial institutions 
face the possibility of signiﬁ  cant additional losses, and 
the ﬂ  ow of credit to some businesses and households 
remains constrained.
  In conjunction with the June 2009 FOMC meeting, 
the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and presidents of the Federal Reserve 
Banks, all of whom participate in FOMC meetings, pro-
vided projections for economic growth, unemployment, 
and inﬂ  ation; these projections are presented in Part 4 
of this report. FOMC participants generally viewed the 
outlook for the economy as having improved modestly 
in recent months. Participants expected real GDP to 
bottom out in the second half of this year and then to 
move onto a path of gradual recovery, bolstered by an 
accommodative monetary policy, government efforts to 
stabilize ﬁ  nancial markets, and ﬁ  scal stimulus. Howev-
er, all participants expected that labor market conditions 
would continue to deteriorate during the remainder of 
this year and improve only slowly over the subsequent 
two years, with the unemployment rate still elevated at 
the end of 2011. FOMC participants expected total and 
core inﬂ  ation to be lower in 2009 than during 2008 as 
a whole, in part because of the sizable amount of slack 
in resource utilization; inﬂ  ation was forecast to remain 
subdued in 2010 and 2011. 
  Participants generally judged that the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the medium-term outlook for 
both economic activity and inﬂ  ation exceeded histori-
cal norms. Participants viewed the risks to their pro-
jections of economic growth over the medium run as 
either balanced or tilted to the downside, and most saw 
the risk to their projections of medium-run inﬂ  ation as 
balanced. Participants also reported their assessments 
of the rates to which key macroeconomic variables 
would be expected to converge in the longer run under 
appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of fur-
ther shocks to the economy. Most participants expected 
real GDP to grow in the longer run at an annual rate of 
about 2½ percent, the unemployment rate to be about 
5 percent, and the rate of consumer price inﬂ  ation to be 
about 2 percent. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  3
Part 2 
Recent Financial and Economic Developments
Economic activity, which fell sharply in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, declined at nearly the same rate in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009. (For the change in real gross 
domestic product (GDP) in recent years, see ﬁ  gure 1.) 
However, the pace of contraction appears to have mod-
erated somewhat of late. To be sure, businesses have 
continued to cut back on investment spending, and ﬁ  rms 
have reacted to the abrupt rise in inventory-sales ratios 
around the turn of the year by cutting production and 
running down inventories at a more rapid pace, par-
ticularly in the motor vehicle sector. Nevertheless, con-
sumer spending seems to have stabilized, on balance, in 
the ﬁ  rst half of this year, and housing activity, while still 
quite depressed, has leveled off in recent months. And, 
while the recession abroad led to another sharp drop 
in export demand in the ﬁ  rst quarter, the latest indica-
tors suggest that the contraction in foreign activity has 
lessened, especially in emerging Asian economies. In 
the labor market, the pace of job loss has diminished in 
recent months from the rate earlier this year; nonethe-
less, employment declines have remained sizable, and 
the unemployment rate has risen sharply. Meanwhile, 
inﬂ  ation remained subdued in the ﬁ  rst half of this year 
(ﬁ  gure 2).
  In early 2009, strains in some ﬁ  nancial markets 
appeared to intensify from the levels seen in late 2008. 
Market participants’ concerns about major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions increased, equity prices for such institutions 
fell, and their credit default swap (CDS) spreads wid-
ened substantially. These developments spilled over to 
broader markets, with equity prices falling and spreads 
of yields on corporate bonds over those on comparable-
maturity Treasury securities moving to near-record 
highs. Deterioration in the functioning of many ﬁ  nan-
cial markets restricted the ﬂ  ow of credit to businesses 
and households.
  In response to these ﬁ  nancial market stresses, the 
Federal Reserve and other government entities imple-
mented additional policy initiatives to support ﬁ  nan-
cial stability and promote economic recovery. Federal 
Reserve initiatives included expanding direct purchases 
of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS), beginning direct purchases of longer-term 
Treasury securities, and providing loans against con-
sumer and other asset-backed securities (ABS).1 Other 
government entities also undertook new measures to 
support the ﬁ  nancial sector, including the provision of 
1. For more information, see Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2009), Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on 
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet (Washington: 
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more capital to banking institutions under the Capital 
Purchase Program, or CPP, and the announcement of 
programs to help banks manage their legacy assets. In 
addition, the bank supervisory agencies undertook a 
special assessment of the capital strength of the largest 
U.S. banking organizations (the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program, or SCAP). 
  Partly as a result of these efforts, conditions in 
ﬁ  nancial markets began to show signs of improvement 
starting in March, although they remained strained. 
During the subsequent few months, both equity prices 
of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms and broad equity price indexes rose, 
on balance, and corporate bond spreads narrowed. 
Firms responded by substituting longer-term ﬁ  nanc-
ing through the corporate bond market for shorter-term 
funding from bank loans and commercial paper (CP). 
Supported by the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF), issuance of consumer 
ABS began to approach pre-crisis levels. Short-term 
interbank funding markets also showed substantial 
improvement, and banking institutions involved in the 
SCAP were able to issue signiﬁ  cant amounts of public 
equity and nonguaranteed debt. However, outstanding 
bank loans to households and nonﬁ  nancial businesses 
continued to decline amid expectations that borrower 
credit quality would deteriorate further, risk spreads in 
many markets that were still quite elevated, and ﬁ  nan-
cial conditions that remained somewhat strained.
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
The Household Sector
Residential Investment and Housing Finance
Although home prices have continued to fall, the steep 
declines in housing demand and construction that began 
in late 2005 appear to be abating. Sales of existing 
single-family homes have ﬂ  attened out at a little more 
than 4 million units at an annual rate since late last year, 
and sales of new single-family homes have been little 
changed since January at a bit below 350,000 units. 
That said, the pace of sales for both new and existing 
homes is still very low by historical standards.
  In the single-family housing sector, starts of new 
units appear to have ﬁ  rmed of late, though they remain 
at a depressed level (ﬁ  gure 3). With this restrained level 
of construction, months’ supply of unsold new homes 
relative to sales has come down somewhat from its 
peak at the turn of the year, but it still remains quite 
high compared with earlier in the decade. Starts in the 
multifamily sector—which had held up well through the 
spring of 2008 even as single-family activity was plum-
meting—have deteriorated considerably over the past 
year. These declines have coincided with a substantial 
worsening of many of the economic and ﬁ  nancial fac-
tors that inﬂ  uence construction in this sector, including 
reports of a pullback in the availability of credit for new 
projects and a sharp decline in the price of apartment 
buildings following a multiyear run-up. 
  House prices continued to fall in the ﬁ  rst part of 
this year. The latest readings from national indexes 
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12 months in the range of 7 to 18 percent (ﬁ  gure 4). 
One such measure with wide geographic coverage, the 
LoanPerformance repeat-sales price index, fell more 
than 9 percent over the 12 months ending in May and 
is now 20 percent below the peak that it achieved in 
mid-2006. Price declines have been particularly marked 
in areas of the country that have experienced a large 
number of foreclosure-related sales, such as Nevada, 
Florida, California, and Arizona. Lower prices improve 
the affordability of homeownership for potential new 
buyers and, all else being equal, should eventually help 
bolster housing demand. However, expectations of fur-
ther declines in house prices can make potential buyers 
reluctant to enter the market. Although consumer sur-
veys continue to suggest that a sizable portion of house-
holds expect house prices to fall in the coming year, the 
share of such households appears to have subsided in 
recent months.
   With house prices still falling, conditions in the labor 
market deteriorating, and household ﬁ  nancial condi-
tions remaining weak, delinquency rates continued to 
rise across all categories of mortgage loans. As of April 
2009, nearly 40 percent of adjustable-rate subprime 
loans and 15 percent of ﬁ  xed-rate subprime loans were 
seriously delinquent (ﬁ  gure 5).2 In May 2009, delin-
quency rates for prime and near-prime loans reached 
2. A mortgage is deﬁ  ned as seriously delinquent if the borrower is 
90 days or more behind in payments or the property is in foreclosure.
about 12 percent for adjustable-rate loans and 4 percent 
for ﬁ  xed-rate loans, representing substantial increases 
over the past year to historic highs.
  Foreclosures also jumped in 2009. Over the last three 
quarters of 2008, about 600,000 homes entered the fore-
closure process each quarter. During the ﬁ  rst quarter of 
2009, about 750,000 homes entered the process. The 
increase may be related to the expiration of temporary 
foreclosure moratoriums that were put in place by some 
state and local governments, some private ﬁ  rms, and the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) late last year. 
The Treasury Department has recently established the 
Making Home Affordable program, which encompasses 
several efforts designed to lower foreclosure rates. The 
program includes a provision to allow borrowers to reﬁ  -
nance easily into mortgages with lower payments and a 
provision to encourage mortgage lenders and servicers 
to modify delinquent mortgages. 
  Interest rates on 30-year ﬁ  xed-rate conforming 
mortgages declined during early 2009; although those 
rates have risen more recently, about in line with 
increases in Treasury rates, mortgage rates remain at 
historically low levels (ﬁ  gure 6). Part of the decrease 
may have reﬂ  ected expansion of the Federal Reserve’s 
agency MBS purchase program. Early in the year, 
spreads of rates on conforming ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages 
over long-term Treasury yields fell to their lowest lev-
els in more than a year. Offer rates on nonconforming 
jumbo ﬁ  xed-rate loans fell slightly but continued to 
be well above rates on conforming loans.3 Although 
3.  Conforming mortgages are those eligible for purchase by Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac; they must be equivalent in risk to a prime 
mortgage with an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio, and they cannot 
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SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 6  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
the declines in rates and spreads made borrowing rela-
tively less expensive for those qualiﬁ  ed for conforming 
mortgages, access to credit remained limited for many 
other borrowers. In the April 2009 Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, a majority 
of respondents indicated that they had tightened stan-
dards on residential mortgages over the preceding three 
months, an extension of the prevailing trend in earlier 
quarters, that about 40 percent of banks had reduced 
the size of existing home equity lines of credit, and that 
only a few of the banks reported having made subprime 
loans. The secondary market for conventional mortgage 
loans not guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
remained essentially shut.
  Mortgage debt outstanding was about ﬂ  at in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009, with the effects of the weakness in the 
housing market and relatively restricted access to credit 
offsetting the inﬂ  uence of lower mortgage rates. The 
available indicators suggest that mortgage debt likely 
remained very soft in the second quarter. Reﬁ  nancing 
activity was somewhat elevated early in the year, prob-
ably due to low mortgage interest rates and the waiver 
of many fees and easing of many underwriting terms 
by the GSEs. However, such activity moderated con-
siderably when interest rates rose during the past few 
months. 
Consumer Spending and Household Finance
Consumer spending appears to have leveled off so far 
this year after falling sharply in the second half of last 
year (ﬁ  gure 7). Continued widespread job losses and 
the drag from large declines in household wealth have 
weighed on consumption; however, spending lately has 
been supported by the boost to household incomes from 
the ﬁ  scal stimulus package enacted in February. Mea-
sures of consumer sentiment, while still at depressed 
levels, have nonetheless moved up from the historical 
lows recorded around the turn of the year.   
  Real personal consumption expenditures (PCE), 
although variable from month to month, have essen-
tially moved sideways since late last year. Sales of 
new light motor vehicles continued to contract early 
this year but have stabilized in recent months—at an 
average annual rate of 9.7 million units over the four 
months ending in June. Outlays on other goods, which 
for a ﬁ  rst mortgage on a single-family home in the contiguous United 
States is currently equal to the greater of $417,000 or 115 percent 
of the area’s median house price; it cannot exceed $625,500. Jumbo 
mortgages are those that exceed the maximum size of a conforming 
loan; they are typically extended to borrowers with relatively strong 
credit histories.
plunged in 2008, have remained at extremely low lev-
els, while spending on services has only edged up so far 
this year.
  Real disposable personal income, or DPI—that is, 
after-tax income adjusted for inﬂ  ation—has risen at an 
annual rate of about 9 percent so far this year, a sub-
stantial pickup from the increase of 1¼ percent posted 
in 2008 (ﬁ  gure 8). Gains in after-tax income have been 
bolstered by the tax cuts and increases in social beneﬁ  t 
payments that were implemented as part of the 2009 ﬁ  s-
cal stimulus package. In contrast, nominal labor income 
has been declining steeply. Although nominal hourly 
compensation has risen at a faster pace than overall 
prices, sizable reductions in employment and the work-
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overall labor compensation. With real after-tax income 
up appreciably in the ﬁ  rst half of the year and consumer 
outlays leveling off, the personal saving rate jumped 
during the spring, reaching nearly 7 percent in May 
compared with the 1¾ percent average recorded during 
2008 (ﬁ  gure 9).
  Household net worth continued to fall in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of this year as a result of the ongoing declines in 
house prices and a further drop in equity prices (ﬁ  gure 
10). However, equity prices have recorded substantial 
gains since March, helping to offset continued declines 
in the value of real estate wealth. The recent stimulus- 
induced jump in real disposable income and the 
improvement in equity wealth since this spring appar-
ently helped lift consumer sentiment somewhat from its 
earlier very low levels (ﬁ  gure 11).
  Nonmortgage consumer debt outstanding is esti-
mated to have fallen at an annual rate of 2 percent in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2009, extending a decline that began in the 
ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008. The decreases likely reﬂ  ect both 
reduced demand for loans as a result of the restrained 
pace of consumer spending and a restricted supply of 
credit. The April 2009 Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer Opinion 
Survey showed a further tightening of standards and 
terms on consumer loans over the preceding three 
months, actions that included lowering credit limits on 
existing credit card accounts.
  The tightening in standards and terms likely reﬂ  ect-
ed, in part, concerns by ﬁ  nancial institutions about con-
sumer credit quality. Delinquency rates on most types 
of consumer lending—credit card loans, auto loans, and 
other nonrevolving loans—continued to rise during the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2009. The increase in credit card loan delin-
quency rates at banks was particularly sharp, and at 
6½ percent as of the end of the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, 
such delinquencies exceeded the level reached during 
the 2001 recession (ﬁ  gure 12). Household bankruptcy 
rates continued the upward trend that has been evident 
since the bankruptcy law reform in 2005; the recent 
increases likely reﬂ  ect the deterioration in household 
ﬁ  nancial conditions.
  Changes in interest rates on consumer loans were 
mixed over the ﬁ  rst half of the year. Auto loan rates 
were about ﬂ  at, credit card rates ticked upward, and 
rates on other consumer loans showed a slight decline. 
Spreads of these rates over those on comparable-
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  Before the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the market for 
ABS provided signiﬁ  cant support for consumer lending 
by effectively reducing the cost to lenders of providing 
such credit. The near-complete cessation of issuance 
in this market in the fourth quarter of 2008 thus likely 
contributed importantly to the curtailment of consumer 
credit. Issuance of credit card, auto, and student loan 
ABS began to pick up in March and approached pre-
crisis levels in April and May. Spreads of yields on 
AAA-rated credit card and auto ABS over yields 
on swaps fell sharply in early 2009, although they 
remained at somewhat elevated levels. The increased 
issuance and falling spreads appeared to reﬂ  ect impor-
tantly the TALF program, which had been announced 
in late 2008 and began operation in March 2009. Avail-
ability of loans to purchase automobiles, which had 
declined sharply at the end of 2008, rebounded in early 
2009 as some auto ﬁ  nance companies accessed credit 
through the TALF and others received funding directly 
from the government. 
The Business Sector
Fixed Investment
Businesses have continued to cut back capital spend-
ing, with declines broadly based across equipment, 
software, and structures. Real business ﬁ  xed investment 
fell markedly in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of this year (ﬁ  gure 13). The cutbacks in busi-
ness investment were prompted by a deterioration late 
last year and early this year in the economic and ﬁ  nan-
cial conditions that inﬂ  uence capital expenditures: In 
particular, business output contracted steeply, corporate 
proﬁ  ts declined, and credit availability remained tight 
for many borrowers. More recently, it appears that the 
declines in capital spending may be abating, and ﬁ  nanc-
ing conditions for businesses have improved somewhat.
  Real business outlays for equipment and software 
dropped at an annual rate of 34 percent in the ﬁ  rst quar-
ter of 2009 after falling nearly as rapidly in the fourth 
quarter. In both quarters, business purchases of motor 
vehicles plunged at annual rates of roughly 80 percent, 
and real spending on high-tech capital—computers, 
software, and communications equipment—fell at an 
annual rate of more than 20 percent. Real investment 
in equipment other than high tech and transporta-
tion, which accounts for nearly one-half of outlays for 
equipment and software, dropped at an annual rate of 
about 35 percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter after falling at a 
20 percent rate in the previous quarter. The available 
indicators suggest that real spending on equipment and 
software fell further in the second quarter, though at a 
much less precipitous pace: Although shipments of non-
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NOTE: High-tech equipment consists of computers and peripheral equip-
ment and communications equipment. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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12. Delinquency rates on consumer loans at commercial  
banks, 1996–2009  
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2009:Q1. Delinquency
rate is the percent of loans 30 days or more past due. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
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continued to fall in April and May, the rate of decline 
slowed from the ﬁ  rst-quarter pace. In addition, business 
purchases of new trucks and cars appear to have sta-
bilized in the second quarter (albeit at low levels), and 
recent surveys of business conditions have been gener-
ally less downbeat than earlier this year.
  Real spending on nonresidential structures turned 
down late last year and fell sharply in the ﬁ  rst quar-
ter. Outlays for construction of commercial and ofﬁ  ce 
buildings declined appreciably late last year and have 
contracted further so far this year. Spending on drill-
ing and mining structures, which had risen briskly for 
a number of years, has plunged this year in response 
to the substantial net decline in energy prices since last 
summer. In contrast, outlays on other energy-related 
projects—such as new power plants and the expansion 
and retooling of existing petroleum reﬁ  neries—have 
been growing rapidly for some time now and contin-
ued to post robust gains through May. On balance, the 
recent data on construction expenditures suggest that 
declines in spending on nonresidential structures may 
have slowed in the second quarter. However, weak busi-
ness output and proﬁ  ts, tight ﬁ  nancing conditions, and 
rising vacancy rates likely will continue to weigh heav-
ily on this sector.
Inventory Investment
Businesses ran off inventories aggressively in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter, as ﬁ  rms entered the year with extremely high 
inventory-sales ratios despite having drawn down 
stocks throughout 2008 (ﬁ  gure 14). Much of the ﬁ  rst-
quarter liquidation occurred in the motor vehicle sector, 
where production was cut sharply and remained low in 
the second quarter. As a result, days’ supply of domestic 
light vehicles dropped from its peak of about 100 days 
in February to less than 70 days at the end of June, 
closer to the automakers’ preferred level.
  Firms outside of the motor vehicle sector also have 
been making signiﬁ  cant production adjustments to 
bring down inventories. Factory output (excluding 
motor vehicles and parts) plunged in the ﬁ  rst quarter, 
and inventories of nonfarm goods other than motor 
vehicles were drawn down noticeably in real terms. 
According to the available data, this pattern of pro-
duction declines and inventory liquidation appears to 
have continued in the second quarter as well. Although 
inventory-sales ratios remain elevated in many indus-
tries, some recent business surveys suggest that ﬁ  rms 
have become more comfortable in recent months with 
the current level of inventories. 
Corporate Proﬁ  ts and Business Finance
Operating earnings per share for S&P 500 ﬁ  rms in the 
ﬁ  rst quarter were about 35 percent below their year-
earlier levels. Proﬁ  tability of both ﬁ  nancial and nonﬁ  -
nancial ﬁ  rms showed steep declines. Analysts’ forecasts 
suggest that the pace of proﬁ  t declines moderated only 
slightly in the second quarter, although downward revi-
sions to forecasts for earnings over the next two years 
have slowed recently.
 Business  ﬁ  nancial conditions in the ﬁ  rst half of the 
year were characterized by lower demand for funds, 
even as ﬁ  nancial conditions eased somewhat on bal-
ance. Borrowing by domestic nonﬁ  nancial businesses 
fell slightly in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 after having slowed 
markedly in the second half of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 15). The 
composition of borrowing shifted, with net issuance of 
corporate bonds surging, while both commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans and CP outstanding fell. This 
reallocation of borrowing may have reﬂ  ected a desire 
by businesses to strengthen their balance sheets by sub-
stituting longer-term sources of ﬁ  nancing for shorter-
term sources during a period when the cost of bond 
ﬁ  nancing was generally falling. In particular, yields on 
both investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds 
dropped sharply, and their spreads over yields on com-
parable-maturity Treasury securities narrowed apprecia-
bly, as investors’ concerns about the economic outlook 
eased. Nonetheless, bond spreads remained somewhat 
elevated by historical standards.
  C&I and commercial real estate (CRE) lending by 
commercial banks were both quite weak in the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2009, likely reﬂ  ecting reduced demand for loans and 
a tighter lending stance on the part of banks. The results 
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14. Change in real business inventories, 2003–09  
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SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 10  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
indicated that commercial banks had tightened terms 
and standards on C&I and CRE loans over the preced-
ing three months (ﬁ  gure 16). The market for commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)—an important 
source of funding before the crisis—remained shut.
  Both seasoned and initial equity offerings by nonﬁ  -
nancial corporations were modest over the ﬁ  rst half of 
2009 (ﬁ  gure 17). Equity retirements are estimated to 
have slowed in early 2009 from their rapid pace during 
the second half of 2008. As a result, net equity issu-
ance in the ﬁ  rst quarter declined by the smallest amount 
since 2002.
  The credit quality of nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms continued 
to deteriorate in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. The pace of rat-
ing downgrades on corporate bonds increased, and 
upgrades were relatively few. Delinquency rates on 
banks’ C&I loans continued to increase in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter, while those on CRE loans rose substantially 
(ﬁ  gure 18). Delinquency rates on construction and land 
development loans for one- to four-family residential 
properties increased to more than 20 percent. Banks 
that responded to the Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer Opinion Sur-
vey conducted in April 2009 expected delinquency and 
charge-off rates on such loans to increase over the rest 
of 2009, assuming that economic activity progressed in 
line with consensus forecasts. 
 Financial  ﬁ  rms issued bonds at a solid pace, includ-
ing both debt issued under the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and debt issued without such guar-
antees. Equity issuance by such ﬁ  rms picked up sub-
stantially from a very low level following the comple-
tion of the SCAP reviews in May.
The Government Sector
Federal Government
The deﬁ  cit in the federal uniﬁ  ed budget has increased 
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16. Net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards  
and increasing spreads on commercial and industrial  
loans to large and medium-sized borrowers, 1993–2009 
Spreads
NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey generally conducted four times
per year; the last observation is from the April 2009 survey, which covers
2009:Q1. Net percentage is the percentage of banks reporting a tightening of
standards or an increase in spreads less the percentage reporting an easing or
a decrease. Spreads are measured as the loan rate less the bank’s cost of
funds. The definition for firm size suggested for, and generally used by,
survey respondents is that large and medium-sized firms have annual sales of
$50 million or more. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on
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17. Components of net equity issuance, 2003–09  
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NOTE: Net equity issuance is the difference between equity issued by
domestic companies in public or private markets and equity retired through
share repurchases, domestic cash-financed mergers, or foreign takeovers of
U.S. firms. Equity issuance includes funds invested by private equity
partnerships and stock option proceeds. 
SOURCE: Thomson Financial, Investment Benchmark Report; Money Tree
Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, National Venture Capital Association,
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15. Selected components of net financing for nonfinancial  




NOTE: The data for the components except bonds are seasonally adjusted.
The data for 2009:Q2 are estimated. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, flow of funds data. 
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costs associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP), the conservatorship of the mortgage-
related GSEs, and the ﬁ  scal stimulus package enacted 
in February, along with the effects of the weak economy 
on outlays and revenues, have all contributed to the 
widening of the budget gap. Over the ﬁ  rst nine months 
of ﬁ  scal year 2009—from October through June—the 
uniﬁ  ed budget recorded a deﬁ  cit of about $1.1 trillion. 
The deﬁ  cit is expected to widen further over the rest of 
the ﬁ  scal year because of the continued slow pace of 
economic activity, additional spending increases and 
tax cuts associated with the ﬁ  scal stimulus legislation, 
and further costs related to ﬁ  nancial stabilization pro-
grams. The budget released by the Ofﬁ  ce of Manage-
ment and Budget in May, which included the effects of 
the President’s budget proposals, calculated that the def-
icit for ﬁ  scal 2009 would total more than $1.8 trillion 
(13 percent of nominal GDP), signiﬁ  cantly larger than 
the deﬁ  cit in ﬁ  scal 2008 of $459 billion (3¼ percent of 
nominal GDP).4
4. The President’s budget includes a placeholder for additional 
funds for ﬁ  nancial stabilization programs that have not been enacted 
but have an estimated budget cost of $250 billion.
  The decline in economic activity has cut deeply 
into tax receipts so far this ﬁ  scal year (ﬁ  gure 19). After 
falling about 2 percent in ﬁ  scal 2008, federal receipts 
dropped about 18 percent in the ﬁ  rst nine months of 
ﬁ  scal 2009 compared with the same period in ﬁ  scal 
2008. The decline in revenue has been particularly 
pronounced for corporate receipts, which have plunged 
as corporate proﬁ  ts have contracted and as ﬁ  rms have 
presumably adjusted payments to take advantage of the 
bonus depreciation provisions contained in the Eco-
nomic Stimulus Act of 2008 and the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Individual income 
and payroll tax receipts have also declined noticeably, 
reﬂ  ecting the weakness in nominal personal income and 
reduced capital gains realizations.5 
  Nominal federal outlays have risen markedly of late. 
After having increased about 9 percent in ﬁ  scal 2008, 
outlays in the ﬁ  rst nine months of ﬁ  scal 2009 were 
almost 21 percent higher than during the same period 
in ﬁ  scal 2008. Spending was boosted, in part, by 
$232 billion in outlays recorded for activities under the 
TARP and the conservatorship of the GSEs so far this 
ﬁ  scal year.6 Spending for income support—particularly 
5. While the 2009 stimulus plan has reduced individual taxes by 
around $13 billion so far in ﬁ  scal 2009, the stimulus tax rebates in 
2008 lowered individual taxes by about $50 billion during the same 
period last year. Thus, the tax cuts associated with ﬁ  scal stimulus 
have not contributed to the year-over-year decline in individual tax 
receipts.
6. In the Monthly Treasury Statements and the Administration’s 
budget, both equity purchases and debt-related transactions under the 
TARP are recorded on a net-present-value basis, taking into account 
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NOTE: The data for commercial banks and life insurance companies are
quarterly and extend through 2009:Q1. The data for commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are monthly and extend through May
2009. The delinquency rates for commercial banks and CMBS are the percent
of loans 30 days or more past due or not accruing interest. The delinquency
rate for life insurance companies is the percent of loans 60 days or more past
due or not accruing interest. 
SOURCE: For commercial banks, Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call
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19. Federal receipts and expenditures, 1989–2009  
Expenditures
excluding net interest
NOTE: Through 2008, receipts and expenditures are on a unified-budget
basis and are for fiscal years (October through September); gross domestic
product (GDP) is for the four quarters ending in Q3. For 2009, receipts and
expenditures are for the 12 months ending in June, and GDP is the average of
2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1. 
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget. 12  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
for unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts—has been pushed 
up by the deterioration in labor market conditions as 
well as by policy decisions to expand funding for a 
number of beneﬁ  t programs. Meanwhile, federal spend-
ing on defense, Medicare, and Social Security also has 
recorded sizable increases. In contrast, net interest pay-
ments declined compared with the same year-earlier 
period, as the reduction in interest rates on Treasury 
debt more than offset the rise in Treasury debt. 
  As measured in the national income and product 
accounts (NIPA), real federal expenditures on consump-
tion and gross investment—the part of federal spending 
that is a direct component of GDP—fell at an annual 
rate of 4½ percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter following its steep 
rise of more than 8 percent in 2008 (ﬁ  gure 20). Real 
defense spending more than accounted for the ﬁ  rst-
quarter contraction, as nondefense outlays increased 
slightly. However, in the second quarter, defense spend-
ing appears to have rebounded, and it is likely to rise 
further in coming quarters given currently enacted 
appropriations.
Federal Borrowing
Federal debt continued to increase in the ﬁ  rst half of 
2009, although at a slightly less rapid pace than had 
been posted in the second half of 2008. Despite the con-
siderable issuance of Treasury securities in the ﬁ  rst half 
of the year, demand at Treasury auctions generally kept 
pace, with bid-to-cover ratios within historical ranges. 
Foreign custody holdings of Treasury securities at the 
recorded on a net-present-value basis. However, equity purchases 
from the GSEs in conservatorship are recorded on a cash-ﬂ  ow basis. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York grew steadily over 
the ﬁ  rst half of the year. Fails-to-deliver of Treasury 
securities, which were elevated earlier in the year, gen-
erally decreased after the May 1 implementation of the 
Treasury Market Practices Group’s recommendation of 
a mandatory charge for delivery failures.7 
State and Local Government
The ﬁ  scal positions of state and local governments have 
deteriorated signiﬁ  cantly over the past year, and budget 
strains are particularly acute in some states, as revenues 
have come in weaker than policymakers expected. At 
the state level, revenues from income, business, and 
sales taxes have declined sharply.8 Plans by states to 
address widening projected budget gaps have included 
cutting planned spending, drawing down rainy day 
funds, and raising taxes and fees. In coming quarters, 
the grants-in-aid included in the ﬁ  scal stimulus legisla-
tion will likely mitigate somewhat the pressures on state 
budgets, but many states are still expecting signiﬁ  cant 
budget gaps for the upcoming ﬁ  scal year. At the local 
level, revenues have held up fairly well; receipts from 
property taxes have continued to rise moderately, 
reﬂ  ecting the typically slow response of property taxes 
to changes in home values.9 Nevertheless, the sharp 
fall in house prices over the past two years is likely to 
put downward pressure on local revenues before long. 
Moreover, many state and local governments have 
experienced signiﬁ  cant capital losses in their employee 
pension funds in the past year, and they will need to 
set aside money in coming years to rebuild pension 
assets.
7. The fails charge is incurred when a party to a repurchase agree-
ment or cash transaction fails to deliver the contracted Treasury secu-
rity to the other party by the date agreed upon. The charge is a share 
of the value of the security, where the share is the greater of 3 percent 
(at an annual rate) minus the target federal funds rate (or the bottom 
of the range when the Federal Open Market Committee speciﬁ  es a 
range) and zero. Previously, the practice was that a failed transaction 
was allowed to settle on a subsequent day at an unchanged invoice 
price; therefore, the cost of a fail was the lost interest on the funds 
owed in the transaction, which was minimal when short-term interest 
rates were very low. The new practice of a fails charge ensures that 
the total cost of a fail is at least 3 percent.
8. Sales taxes account for nearly one-half of the tax revenues col-
lected by state governments.
9. The delay between changes in house prices and changes in prop-
erty tax revenues likely occurs for three reasons. First, property taxes 
are based on assessed property values from the previous year. Second, 
in many jurisdictions, assessments are required to lag contemporane-
ous changes in market values (or they lag such changes for adminis-
trative reasons). Third, many localities are subject to state limits on 
the annual increases in total property tax payments and property value 
assessments. Thus, increases and decreases in market prices for hous-
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  Outlays by state and local governments have been 
restrained by the pressures on their budgets. As meas-
ured in the NIPA, aggregate real expenditures on 
consumption and gross investment by state and local 
governments—the part of state and local spending that 
is a direct component of GDP—fell in both the fourth 
quarter of last year and the ﬁ  rst quarter of this year, led 
by sharp declines in real construction spending. How-
ever, recent data on construction expenditures suggest 
that investment spending in the second quarter picked 
up, reversing a portion of the earlier declines. State and 
local employment has remained about ﬂ  at over the past 
year, although some state and local governments are 
in the process of reducing outlays for compensation 
through wage freezes and mandatory furloughs that 
are not reﬂ  ected in the employment ﬁ  gures.
State and Local Government Borrowing
On net, bond issuance by state and local governments 
picked up in the second quarter of 2009 after having 
been tepid during the ﬁ  rst quarter. Issuance of short-
term debt remained modest, although about in line 
with typical seasonal patterns. Issuance of long-term 
debt, which is generally used to fund capital spending 
projects or to refund existing long-term debt, increased 
from the sluggish pace seen in the second half of 2008. 
The composition of new issues continued to be skewed 
toward higher-rated borrowers. 
  Interest rates on long-term municipal bonds declined 
in April as investors’ concerns about the credit quality 
of municipal bonds appeared to ease somewhat with 
the passage of the ﬁ  scal stimulus plan, which included 
a substantial increase in the amount of federal grants 
to states and localities. That bill also aided the ﬁ  nances 
of state and local governments by establishing Build 
America Bonds, taxable state and local government 
bonds whose interest payments are subsidized by the 
Treasury at a 35 percent rate. Yields on municipal secu-
rities rose somewhat in May and June, concomitant 
with the rise in other long-term interest rates 
over that period; even so, the ratio of municipal 
bond yields to those on comparable-maturity 
Treasury securities dropped to its lowest level in 
almost a year. 
  In contrast to long-term municipal bond markets, 
conditions in short-term municipal bond markets con-
tinued to exhibit substantial strains. Market participants 
continued to report that the cost of liquidity support 
and credit enhancement for variable-rate demand obli-
gations (VRDOs)—bonds that combine long maturi-
ties with ﬂ  oating short-term interest rates—remained 
substantially higher than it had been a year earlier.10 
In addition, auctions of most remaining auction-rate 
securities failed. Some municipalities were able to issue 
new VRDOs, but many lower-rated issuers appeared to 
be either unwilling or unable to issue this type of debt 
at the prices that would be demanded of them. How-
ever, the seven-day Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association swap index, a measure of yields 
for high-grade VRDOs, declined to the lowest level on 
record, suggesting that the market was working well for 
higher-rated issuers.
The External Sector
The demand for U.S. exports dropped sharply in the 
ﬁ  rst quarter. However, U.S. demand for imports fell 
even more precipitously, softening the decline in real 
GDP. 
  Real exports of goods and services declined at an 
annual rate of 31 percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter, exceeding 
even the 24 percent rate of decline in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 21). Exports in almost all major catego-
ries contracted, with exports of machinery, industrial 
supplies, automotive products, and services recording 
large decreases. (Exports of aircraft were the excep-
tion, with increases following the end of strike-related 
10.  VRDOs are taxable or tax-exempt bonds that combine long 
maturities with ﬂ  oating short-term interest rates that are reset on a 
weekly, monthly, or other periodic basis. VRDOs also have a contrac-
tual liquidity backstop, typically provided by a commercial or invest-
ment bank, that ensures that bondholders are able to redeem their 
investment at par plus accrued interest even if the securities cannot be 
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21. Change in real imports and exports of goods and services, 
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NOTE: Data for 2009:Q1 are expressed as percent change from 2008:Q4. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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production disruptions in the fourth quarter.) All of our 
major trading partners reduced their demand for U.S. 
exports, with exports to Canada, Europe, and Mexico 
exhibiting especially signiﬁ  cant declines. Data for April 
and May suggest that exports in the second quarter 
continued to fall, although more moderately, reﬂ  ecting 
a slowing in the rate of contraction in foreign economic 
activity.
  Real imports of goods and services fell at an annual 
rate of more than 36 percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter. The 
drop in imports was widespread across U.S. trading 
partners, with large declines observed for imports from 
Canada, Europe, Japan, and Latin America. All major 
categories of imports fell, with imports of machinery, 
automotive products, and industrial supplies display-
ing particularly pronounced declines. The sharp fall 
in exports and imports of automotive products partly 
reﬂ  ected cutbacks in North American production of 
motor vehicles, which relies heavily on ﬂ  ows of parts 
and ﬁ  nished vehicles among the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico.
 In  the  ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, the U.S. current account 
deﬁ  cit was $406 billion at an annual rate, or a bit less 
than 3 percent of GDP, considerably narrower than the 
$706 billion deﬁ  cit recorded in 2008 (ﬁ  gure 22). The 
narrowing largely reﬂ  ected the sharp reduction in the 
U.S. trade deﬁ  cit, with the contraction in real imports 
described earlier being compounded by a steep fall in 
the value of nominal oil imports as oil prices declined.
  Import prices fell sharply in late 2008 and the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of this year, but they have stabilized over the 
past few months. This pattern was inﬂ  uenced impor-
tantly by the swing in prices for oil and non-oil com-
modities, which turned back up in the second quarter. 
Prices for ﬁ  nished goods declined only slightly in the 
last quarter of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of this year and 
have increased slightly in recent months.
  The price of crude oil in world markets rose consid-
erably over the ﬁ  rst half of this year (ﬁ  gure 23). After 
plunging from a record high of more than $145 per bar-
rel in mid-July 2008 to a December average of about 
$40, the spot price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) 
crude oil rebounded to about $60 per barrel in mid-July 
of this year. The rebound in oil prices appears to reﬂ  ect 
the view that the global demand for oil has begun to 
pick up once again. In addition, the ongoing effects of 
previous reductions in OPEC supply seem to be putting 
upward pressure on oil prices. The prices of longer-term 
futures contracts for crude oil have moved up to around 
$85 per barrel, reﬂ  ecting the view that the market will 
continue to tighten as global demand strengthens over 
the medium term.
National Saving
Total net national saving—that is, the saving of house-
holds, businesses, and governments, excluding depre-
ciation charges as measured in the NIPA—fell to a level 
of negative 1½ percent of nominal GDP in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of this year, its lowest reading in the post–World 
War II period (ﬁ  gure 24). After having reached 3½ per-
cent of nominal GDP in early 2006, net national saving 
dropped over the subsequent three years as the federal 
budget deﬁ  cit widened substantially and the ﬁ  scal posi-
tions of state and local governments deteriorated. In 
contrast, private saving has risen considerably, on bal-
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23. Prices of oil and nonfuel commodities, 2004–09  
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NOTE: The data are monthly. The oil price is the spot price of West Texas
intermediate crude oil, and the last observation is the average for July 1–15,
2009. The price of nonfuel commodities is an index of 45
primary-commodity prices and extends through June 2009. 
SOURCE: For oil, the Commodity Research Bureau; for nonfuel
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has been more than offset by the recent jump in person-
al saving. National saving will likely remain very low 
this year in light of the weak economy and the probable 
further widening of the federal budget deﬁ  cit. Nonethe-
less, if not boosted over the longer run, persistent low 
levels of national saving will likely be associated with 
both low rates of capital formation and heavy borrow-
ing from abroad, which would limit the rise in the stan-
dard of living of U.S. residents over time and hamper 




The labor market deteriorated signiﬁ  cantly further in 
the ﬁ  rst half of this year as employment continued to 
fall and the unemployment rate rose sharply. The job 
losses so far this year have been widespread across 
industries and have brought the cumulative decline in 
private employment since December 2007 to more than 
6½ million jobs. In recent months, however, the pace of 
job loss has moderated somewhat. Private nonfarm pay-
roll employment fell by 670,000 jobs, on average, per 
month from January to April, but the declines slowed 
to 312,000 in May and 415,000 in June (ﬁ  gure 25). In 
contrast, the civilian unemployment rate has continued 
to move up rapidly so far this year, climbing 2¼ per-
centage points between December 2008 and June to 
9½ percent (ﬁ  gure 26). 
  Virtually all major industries experienced consider-
able job losses in the ﬁ  rst few months of the year. More 
recently, employment declines in many industry groups 
have eased, and some industries have reported small 
gains. The May and June declines in construction jobs 
were the smallest since last fall, job declines in tempo-
rary help services slowed noticeably, and employment 
in nonbusiness services turned up in May and increased 
further in June. Meanwhile, in the manufacturing 
sector, employment declines have subsided a bit in 
recent months but still remain sizable; job losses in 
this sector have totaled 1.9 million since the start of 
the recession.
  In addition to shedding jobs, ﬁ  rms have cut their 
labor input by shortening hours worked. Average week-
ly hours of production and nonsupervisory workers on 
private payrolls dropped sharply through June. In addi-
tion, the share of persons who reported that they were 
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2009:Q1. Nonfederal
saving is the sum of personal and net business saving and the net saving of
state and local governments. GDP is gross domestic product. 
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includes individuals whose hours have been cut by their 
employers as well as those who would like to move to 
full-time jobs but are unable to ﬁ  nd them—is high. 
  Since the beginning of the recession in December 
2007, the unemployment rate has risen more than 
4½ percentage points. The rise in joblessness has been 
especially pronounced for those who lost their jobs 
permanently; these individuals tend to take longer to 
ﬁ  nd new jobs than those on temporary layoffs or those 
who left their jobs voluntarily, and their difﬁ  culty in 
ﬁ  nding new jobs has been exacerbated by the ongoing 
weakness in hiring. Accordingly, the median duration 
of uncompleted spells of unemployment has increased 
from 8½ weeks in December 2007 to 18 weeks in June 
2009, and the number of workers unemployed more 
than 15 weeks has moved up appreciably. 
  The labor force participation rate, which typically 
weakens during periods of rising unemployment, 
decreased gradually through March but has moved up 
somewhat, on balance, in recent months (ﬁ  gure 27). 
The emergency unemployment insurance programs that 
were introduced last July have likely contributed to the 
higher participation rate and unemployment rate by 
encouraging unemployed individuals to remain in the 
labor force to continue to look for work. In addition, 
anecdotes suggest that the impairment of household 
balance sheets during this recession may have led some 
workers to delay retirement and other workers to enter 
the labor force. 
  Other more recent indicators suggest that conditions 
in the labor market remain very weak. Initial claims for 
unemployment insurance, which rose dramatically ear-
lier this year, have fallen noticeably from their peak but 
remain elevated, and the number of individuals receiv-
ing regular and emergency unemployment insurance 
beneﬁ  ts climbed, reaching nearly 10 million at the end 
of June.
Productivity and Labor Compensation
Labor productivity has continued to increase at a sur-
prising rate during the most recent downturn, in part 
because ﬁ  rms have responded to the contraction in 
aggregate demand by aggressively reducing employ-
ment and shortening the workweeks of their employees. 
According to the latest available published data, output 
per hour in the nonfarm business sector increased at 
an annual rate of about 1½ percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter 
after rising 2¼ percent during all of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 28). If 
these productivity estimates prove to be accurate, they 
would suggest that the fundamental factors that have 
supported a solid trend in underlying productivity in 
recent years—such as the rapid pace of technological 
change and ongoing efforts by ﬁ  rms to use information 
technology to improve the efﬁ  ciency of their opera-
tions—remain in place. 
  Alternative measures of nominal hourly compensa-
tion and wages suggest, on balance, that increases in 
labor costs have slowed this year in response to the 
sizable amount of slack in labor markets. The employ-
ment cost index (ECI) for private industry workers, 
which measures both wages and the cost to employers 
of providing beneﬁ  ts, has decelerated considerably over 
the past year (ﬁ  gure 29). This measure of compensation 
increased less than 2 percent in nominal terms between 
March 2008 and March 2009 after rising 3¼ percent in 
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NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through June 2009. 
















NOTE: Nonfarm business sector. Change for each multiyear period is
measured to the fourth quarter of the final year of the period from the fourth
quarter of the year immediately preceding the period. 
SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  17
ings of production and nonsupervisory workers—a 
more timely, but narrower, measure of wage develop-
ments—have also decelerated signiﬁ  cantly, especially 
in recent months. In contrast, compensation per hour 
(CPH) in the nonfarm business sector—an alternative 
measure of hourly compensation derived from the data 
in the NIPA—increased about 4 percent over the year 
ending in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, similar to the rate of 
increase seen during the past several years. 
  The much slower pace of overall consumer price 
inﬂ  ation over the past year has supported real wage 
growth. Indeed, changes in both broad measures of 
hourly compensation—the ECI and CPH—have picked 
up in real terms over the past year, as has the inﬂ  ation-
adjusted increase in average hourly earnings. Nonethe-
less, as noted previously, with the sharp reduction in 
total hours worked, real wage and salary income of 
households has fallen over this period.
Prices
Headline consumer prices, which fell sharply late last 
year with the marked deterioration in economic activ-
ity and drop-off in the prices of crude oil and other 
commodities, have risen at a moderate pace so far this 
year. While the margin of slack in product and labor 
markets has widened considerably further this year, put-
ting downward pressure on inﬂ  ation, many commodity 
prices have retraced part of their earlier declines. All 
told, the chain-type price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures increased at an annual rate of about 
1¾ percent between December 2008 and May 2009, 
compared with its ¾ percent rise over the 12 months 
of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 30). The core PCE price index—which 
excludes the prices of energy items as well as those of 
food and beverages—also has increased at a moderate 
pace so far this year following especially low rates of 
increase late in 2008. Data for PCE prices in June are 
not yet available, but information from the consumer 
price index and other sources suggests that total PCE 
prices posted a relatively large increase that month as 
gasoline prices jumped; core consumer price increases 
were moderate. 
  Consumer energy prices ﬂ  attened out, on balance, in 
the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve months of 2009 following their sharp drop 
late last year. However, crude oil prices have turned up 
again, with the spot price of WTI rising to around $60 
per barrel in mid-July from about $40, on average, last 
December. The increase in crude costs has been putting 
upward pressure on the price of gasoline at the pump in 
recent months. In contrast, natural gas prices continued 
to plunge over the ﬁ  rst half of this year in response 
to burgeoning supplies from new wells in Louisiana, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas that boosted 
inventories above historical midyear averages. Con-
sumer prices for electricity have edged down so far this 
year—after rising briskly through the end of last year—
as fossil fuel input costs have continued to decline. 
  Food prices decelerated considerably in the ﬁ  rst part 
of this year in response to the dramatic downturn in 
spot prices of crops and livestock in the second half of 
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2009:Q1. For nonfarm
business compensation, change is over four quarters; for the employment cost
index (ECI), change is over the 12 months ending in the last month of each
quarter. The nonfarm business sector excludes farms, government, nonprofit
institutions, and households. The sector covered by the ECI used here is the
nonfarm business sector plus nonprofit institutions. A new ECI series was
introduced for data as of 2001, but the new series is continuous with the old. 
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30. Change in the chain-type price index for personal  
consumption expenditures, 2003–09  
NOTE: Through 2008, change is from December to December; for 2009,
change is from December to May. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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PCE price index for food and beverages decreased at an 
annual rate of 1 percent between December 2008 and 
May 2009.
  Core PCE prices rose at an annual rate of 2½ percent 
over the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve months of the year, compared with 
1¾ percent over all of 2008. The pickup in core inﬂ  a-
tion during the ﬁ  rst part of this year reﬂ  ected, in part, 
a jump in the prices of tobacco products associated 
with large increases in federal and state excise taxes 
this spring; excluding tobacco prices—for which the 
large increases likely were one-off adjustments—
core inﬂ  ation was unchanged at 1¾ percent over this 
period. Aside from tobacco, prices for other core 
goods snapped back early this year—following heavy 
discounting at the end of last year in reaction to weak 
demand and excess inventories—but have been little 
changed for the most part in recent months. In contrast, 
prices for a wide range of non-energy services have 
decelerated noticeably further this year. 
  Survey-based measures of near-term inﬂ  ation expec-
tations declined late last year and early this year as 
actual headline inﬂ  ation came down markedly, but, in 
recent months, some measures have moved back up 
close to their average levels of recent years. According 
to the Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Con-
sumers, median expectations for year-ahead inﬂ  ation 
stood at 3.0 percent in the preliminary estimate for July, 
up from about 2 percent around the turn of the year. 
Indicators of longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations have 
been steadier over this period. These expectations in the 
Reuters/University of Michigan survey stood at 3.1 per-
cent in the preliminary July release, about the measure’s 
average value over all of 2008.
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEVELOPMENTS
Evolution of the Financial Turmoil, Policy 
Actions, and the Market Response
Stresses in ﬁ  nancial markets intensiﬁ  ed in the ﬁ  rst few 
months of 2009 but have eased more recently. Credit 
default swap spreads for bank holding companies—
which primarily reﬂ  ect investors’ assessments of the 
likelihood of those institutions defaulting on their debt 
obligations—rose sharply in early January on renewed 
concerns that some of those ﬁ  rms could face consider-
able capital shortfalls and liquidity difﬁ  culties (ﬁ  gure 
31). Equity prices for banking and insurance companies 
fell in the ﬁ  rst quarter of the year as a number of large 
ﬁ  nancial institutions reported substantial losses for the 
fourth quarter of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 32).
  Strains in short-term funding markets persisted 
in January and February. A measure of stress in the 
interbank market, the spread of the London interbank 
offered rate (Libor) over the rate on comparable-
maturity overnight index swaps (OIS), remained at 
elevated levels early in the year (ﬁ  gure 33). Required 
margins of collateral (also known as haircuts) and bid-
asked spreads generally continued to be wide in the 
markets for repurchase agreements backed by many 
types of securities.
 Other  ﬁ  nancial markets also continued to show 
signs of stress during the ﬁ  rst two months of the year. 
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. 
SOURCE: Standard & Poor’s. 











31. Spreads on credit default swaps for selected U.S.  
banks, 2007–09  
Other banks
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. Median spreads
for 6 bank holding companies and 12 other banks. 
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close to historical lows, and issuance—particularly of 
loans intended for nonbank lenders—dropped to very 
low levels (ﬁ  gure 34). Issuance of securities backed 
by credit card loans, nonrevolving consumer loans, 
and auto loans continued to be minimal in the ﬁ  rst few 
months of the year, and there was no issuance of CMBS 
in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 (ﬁ  gure 35). An index based on 
CDS spreads on AAA-rated CMBS widened and neared 
the peak levels seen in November. Broad equity price 
indexes continued to fall, and measures of equity price 
volatility remained very high (ﬁ  gures 36 and 37).
  Nonetheless, a few ﬁ  nancial markets showed signs 
of improvement early in the year. In the CP market, 
spreads on shorter-maturity A1/P1 nonﬁ  nancial and 
ﬁ  nancial CP as well as on asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) over AA nonﬁ  nancial CP declined mod-
estly (ﬁ  gure 38). Although part of the improvement 
likely reﬂ  ected greater demand from institutional inves-
tors as short-term Treasury yields declined to near zero 
on occasion, CP markets continued to be supported by 
the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facil-
ity (CPFF). More notably, spreads on shorter-maturity 











35. Gross issuance of selected commercial mortgage- and  
asset-backed securities, 2007–09  
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NOTE: CMBS are securities backed by commercial mortgages; consumer
ABS (asset-backed securities) are securities backed by credit card loans,
nonrevolving consumer loans, and auto loans. Data for consumer ABS show
gross issuance facilitated by the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) and such issuance outside the TALF. 
SOURCE: For ABS, Bloomberg and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
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36. Stock price indexes, 1998–2009  
Dow Jones financial index
NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. 

















34. Secondary-market pricing for syndicated loans,  
2007–09  
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. 












33. Libor minus overnight index swap rate, 2007–09  
Six-month
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. An overnight
index swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap with the floating rate tied to an index
of daily overnight rates, such as the effective federal funds rate. At maturity,
two parties exchange, on the basis of the agreed notional amount, the
difference between interest accrued at the fixed rate and interest accrued by
averaging the floating, or index, rate. Libor is the London interbank offered
rate. 
SOURCE: For Libor, British Bankers’ Association; for the OIS rate, Prebon. 20  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
ties dropped early in the year, reﬂ  ecting, in part, the 
effects of Federal Reserve purchases of agency debt and 
agency MBS (ﬁ  gure 40). Interest rates on 30-year ﬁ  xed 
rate conforming mortgages also fell.
  In an effort to help restore conﬁ  dence in the strength 
of U.S. ﬁ  nancial institutions and restart the ﬂ  ow of 
lending to businesses and households, on February 10, 
the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the Ofﬁ  ce 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Ofﬁ  ce of 
Thrift Supervision announced the Financial Stability 
CPFF, also fell. In the corporate bond market, spreads 
of yields on BBB-rated and speculative-grade bonds 
relative to yields on comparable-maturity Treasury 
securities narrowed in January and February, although 
they remained at historically high levels (ﬁ  gure 39). 
Spreads on 10-year Fannie Mae debt and option-
adjusted spreads on Fannie Mae mortgage-backed 
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NOTE: The data are weekly and extend through July 15, 2009. Commercial
paper yield spreads are for an overnight maturity and are expressed relative to
the AA nonfinancial rate. Outstandings are seasonally adjusted. 












40. Spreads on 10-year Fannie Mae debt and option-  
adjusted spreads on Fannie Mae mortgage-backed  
securities, 2007–09  
MBS
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. The spreads
are over Treasury securities of comparable maturities. MBS are
mortgage-backed securities. 
SOURCE: For MBS, Bloomberg; for debt, Merrill Lynch and the Federal
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39. Spreads of corporate bond yields over comparable  
off-the-run Treasury yields, by securities rating,  
1998–2009  
BBB
NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. The spreads
shown are the yields on 10-year bonds less the 10-year Treasury yield. 
SOURCE: Derived from smoothed corporate yield curves using Merrill
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37. Implied S&P 500 volatility, 1998–2009  
NOTE: The data are weekly and extend through the week ending
July 17, 2009. The final observation is an estimate based on data through
July 15, 2009. The series shown—the VIX—is the implied 30-day volatility
of the S&P 500 stock price index as calculated from a weighted average of
options prices. 
SOURCE: Chicago Board Options Exchange. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  21
Plan. The plan included the Capital Assistance Program 
(CAP), designed to assess the capital needs of deposito-
ry institutions under a range of economic scenarios and 
to help increase the amount and strengthen the qual-
ity of their capital if necessary; a new Public-Private 
Investment Program, or PPIP, which would combine 
public and private capital with government ﬁ  nancing 
to help banks dispose of legacy assets and strengthen 
their balance sheets, thereby supporting new lending; 
an expansion of the Federal Reserve’s TALF program; 
and an extension of the senior debt portion of the 
FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 
to October 31, 2009.
  The announcement of the plan did not lead to an 
immediate improvement in ﬁ  nancial market conditions. 
Bank and insurance company equity prices continued to 
decline, and CDS spreads of such institutions widened 
to levels above those observed the previous fall. Market 
participants were reportedly unclear about the method-
ology that would underlie the assessment of bank capi-
tal needs. The timing of the announcement of the results 
and the likely policy responses from this part of the 
CAP—formally named the SCAP, but popularly known 
as the stress test—were also sources of uncertainty.
(CAP and SCAP are described in greater detail in the 
box titled “Capital Assistance Program and Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program.”) On March 2, American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG), reported losses of more 
than $60 billion for the fourth quarter of 2008, and the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve announced a restruc-
turing of the government assistance to AIG to enhance 
the company’s capital and liquidity in order to facilitate 
the orderly completion of its global divestiture program.
  On March 3, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
announced the launch of the TALF. In the initial phase 
of the program, the Federal Reserve offered to provide 
up to $200 billion of three-year loans on a nonrecourse 
basis secured by AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and 
recently originated auto loans, credit card loans, stu-
dent loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration. The Treasury’s TARP would purchase 
$20 billion of subordinated debt in a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) created by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. The SPV would purchase and manage any 
assets received by the New York Fed in connection 
with any TALF loans. The demand for TALF funding 
was initially modest, reportedly on concerns that future 
changes in government policies could adversely affect 
TALF borrowers.
  Financial markets began to show signs of improve-
ment in early March when a few large banks indi-
cated that they had been proﬁ  table in January and 
February. Sentiment continued to improve after the 
March 17–18 meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), at which, against a backdrop of 
weakening economic activity and signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial 
market strains, the Committee announced that it would 
expand its purchases of agency MBS by $750 billion, 
and of agency debt by $100 billion; in addition, it 
would also purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term 
Treasury securities over the next six months. Yields on 
a wide range of longer-term debt securities dropped 
substantially within a day of the release of the Com-
mittee’s statement. First-quarter earnings results pre-
announced by some large ﬁ  nancial institutions were 
substantially better than expected, although some of 
the surprise was attributable to greater-than-anticipated 
effects of revisions in accounting rules.11 Equity prices 
of banks and insurance companies rose, and CDS 
spreads for such institutions narrowed, although to still-
elevated levels. Broad stock price indexes also climbed 
and measures of equity price volatility declined. Libor-
OIS spreads began to edge down. Spreads on lower-
rated investment-grade and speculative-grade corporate 
bonds over comparable-maturity Treasury securities 
also fell, though again to levels that remained high by 
historical standards. Bid-asked spreads on speculative-
grade bonds declined. Similarly, bid-asked spreads nar-
rowed in the leveraged loan market. 
 Conditions  in  ﬁ  nancial markets continued to improve 
in the second quarter, aided in part by the emergence 
of more detail on the SCAP program and the release 
of its results on May 7. Market participants reportedly 
viewed the amount of additional capital that banks 
were required to raise in conjunction with the SCAP 
as relatively modest. With uncertainty about the SCAP 
results resolved, and amid the ongoing improvements in 
ﬁ  nancial markets, market participants appeared to mark 
down the probability of extremely adverse ﬁ  nancial 
market outcomes. Equity prices for many large banks 
and insurance companies rose even as substantial equity 
issuance by banks covered by the SCAP program added 
to supply. The secondary market for leveraged loans 
also showed improvement, with the average bid price 
11.  In early April, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
issued new guidance related to fair value measurements and other-
than-temporary impairments (OTTIs). The new fair value guidance 
reduces the emphasis to be placed on the “last transaction price” 
in valuing assets when markets are not active and transactions are 
likely to be forced or distressed. The new OTTI guidance will require 
impairment write-downs through earnings only for the credit-related 
portion of a debt security’s fair value impairment when two criteria 
are met:  (1) The institution does not have the intent to sell the debt 
security, and (2) it is unlikely that the institution will be required to 
sell the debt security before a forecasted recovery of its cost basis. 
The two changes have resulted in higher fair value estimates and 
reductions in impairments, improving institutions’ reported ﬁ  rst-
quarter earnings.22  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
On February 10, 2009, the Treasury, Federal 
Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and Office of Thrift Supervision announced a 
Capital Assistance Program (CAP) to ensure that 
the largest banking institutions would be appro-
priately capitalized with high-quality capital. As 
part of this program, the federal banking supervi-
sors undertook a Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP) to evaluate the capital needs of 
the largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) 
under a more challenging economic environment 
than generally anticipated. The Treasury and fed-
eral banking agencies believe it important for the 
largest BHCs to have a capital buffer sufficient 
to withstand losses and allow them to meet the 
credit needs of their customers if the economy 
were to weaken more than expected in order to 
help facilitate a broad and sustainable economic 
recovery. 
  The SCAP was initiated on February 25, 2009, 
and results were released publicly on May 7, 
2009. U.S. BHCs with risk-weighted assets of 
more than $100 billion at the end of 2008 were 
required to participate. The objective of the 
exercise was to conduct a comprehensive and 
consistent assessment simultaneously on the 
largest BHCs using a common set of alternative 
macroeconomic scenarios and a common for-
ward-looking conceptual framework. Extensive 
information was collected on the characteristics 
of the major loan, securities, and trading port-
folios, revenues, and modeling methods of the 
institutions. With this information, supervisors 
were able to apply a consistent and systematic 
approach across firms to estimate losses, rev-
enues, and reserves for 2009 and 2010, and to 
determine whether firms would need to raise 
capital to build a buffer to withstand larger-than-
expected losses. The SCAP buffer for each BHC 
was sized to achieve a Tier 1 risk-based ratio of 
6 percent and a Tier 1 Common risk-based ratio 
of 4 percent at the end of 2010 under a more 
severe macroeconomic scenario than expected. 
  Supervisors took the unusual step of publicly 
reporting the findings of the SCAP. The decision 
to depart from the standard practice of maintain-
ing confidentiality of examination information 
stemmed from the belief that greater clarity 
around the SCAP process and findings would 
make the exercise more effective at reducing 
uncertainty and restoring confidence in financial 
institutions.1 
  Results of the SCAP indicated that 10 firms 
would need to augment their capital or improve 
the quality of the capital from 2008:Q4 levels; 
the combined amount totaled $185 billion, 
nearly all of which is required to meet the tar-
get Tier 1 Common risk-based ratio. Between 
the end of 2008 and the release of the results 
in May, many firms had already completed or 
contracted for asset sales or restructured exist-
ing capital instruments. After adjusting for these 
transactions and revenues that exceeded what 
had been assumed in the SCAP, the combined 
amount of additional capital needed to estab-
lish the buffer was $75 billion. The 10 firms 
are required to raise the additional capital by 
November 9, 2009.
  Since the release of the results, almost all of 
the 10 firms that were asked to raise capital buf-
fers issued new common equity in the public 
markets and raised about $40 billion; they also 
raised a substantial additional amount of capi-
tal by exchanging preferred shares to common 
shares and selling assets. Firms that do not meet 
their buffer requirement can issue mandatory 
convertible shares to the Treasury in an amount 
up to 2 percent of the institution’s risk-weighted 
assets (or higher on request), as a bridge to pri-
vate capital. In addition, firms can apply to the 
Treasury to exchange their existing Capital Pur-
chase Program preferred stock to help meet their 
buffer requirement. To protect taxpayers, firms 
will be expected to have issued private capital 
before or simultaneously with the exchange.
  The firms not asked to augment their capital 
also raised about $20 billion in common equity 
in May and early June. Most of these firms and 
others applied for and received approval from 
their supervisors to repay their outstanding Capi-
tal Purchase Program preferred stock. In early 
June, 10 large BHCs repaid about $68 billion to 
the Treasury. A number of banks have also been 
able to issue debt not guaranteed by the FDIC’s 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.
1.  A description of the methodology and a summary of 
results, including loss rates on major loan categories for each 
firm, is available at www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/scap.
htm.
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rising considerably; issuance, however, particularly of 
institutional loans, remained very weak. Short-term 
interbank funding markets continued to improve, with 
Libor-OIS spreads at one-month tenors declining to 
near pre-crisis levels; spreads at longer tenors also 
fell but remained very high. Demand for TALF funds 
increased in May and June, particularly for securities 
backed by credit card and auto loans. Supported by the 
TALF, issuance of consumer ABS picked up further in 
May, and it began to approach pre-crisis levels. Also in 
May, the Federal Reserve announced that, starting in 
June, CMBS and securities backed by insurance pre-
mium ﬁ  nance loans would be eligible collateral under 
the TALF. Financial markets abroad also improved 
during the second quarter, reﬂ  ecting improved global 
economic prospects and positive news from the banking 
sector (see “International Developments” for additional 
detail).
  In early June, the Federal Reserve outlined the cri-
teria it would use to evaluate applications to redeem 
Treasury capital from participants in the SCAP. On 
June 17, 10 banking institutions redeemed about 
$68 billion in Treasury capital. At about the same time, 
the 10 banking organizations that had been required 
under the SCAP to bolster their capital buffers all sub-
mitted plans that would provide sufﬁ  cient capital to 
meet the required buffer under the assessment’s more 
adverse scenario. On June 25, the Federal Reserve 
announced that while it would extend a number of its 
liquidity facilities through early 2010, in light of the 
improvement in ﬁ  nancial conditions and reduced usage 
of some of its facilities, it would trim their size and 
adjust some of their terms.
Banking Institutions
Proﬁ  tability of the commercial banking sector, as 
measured by return on assets and return on equity, 
recovered somewhat in the ﬁ  rst quarter after having 
posted near-record lows in the fourth quarter of 2008 
(ﬁ  gure 41). Proﬁ  ts were concentrated at the largest 
banks and were driven by a rebound in trading rev-
enue as well as reduced noninterest expense related 
to smaller write-downs of intangible assets. Smaller 
banks, in contrast, continued to lose money amid 
mounting credit losses. Indeed, at the industry level, 
loan quality deteriorated substantially from the already 
poor levels recorded late last year, with delinquency 
rates on credit card loans reaching their highest level on 
record (back to 1991). Delinquency rates on residential 
mortgages held by banks soared to 8 percent. Regula-
tory capital ratios improved in the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 as commercial banks 
received substantial capital infusions—likely related to 
funds received by their parent bank holding companies 
under the Capital Purchase Program—while total assets 
declined. Despite a decline in loans outstanding, unused 
commitments to fund loans to both households and 
businesses shrank at an annual rate of more than 
30 percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 (ﬁ  gure 42).
  Commercial bank lending contracted at an annual 
rate of nearly 7 percent during the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, 
reﬂ  ecting weak loan demand and tight credit condi-
tions. C&I loans fell at an annual rate of about 14 per- 
cent over this period, partly as a result of broad and 
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41. Commercial bank profitability, 1988–2009  
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2009:Q1. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
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42. Change in unused bank loan commitments to  
businesses and households, 1990–2009  
NOTE: The data, which are not seasonally adjusted, are quarterly and
extend through 2009:Q1. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
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investment spending by businesses. Some of these pay-
downs also were likely related to increased issuance 
of longer-term corporate debt, as nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms—
especially those rated as investment grade—tapped the 
corporate bond market. CRE loans ran off steadily, like-
ly a result of continued weakness in that sector. Bank 
loans to households also fell over the ﬁ  rst half of the 
year, particularly in the spring, as banks reportedly sold 
or securitized large volumes of residential mortgages 
and consumer credit card loans. Loan loss reserves 
reported by large banks increased considerably in the 
second quarter, suggesting continued deterioration in 
credit quality and further pressure on earnings.
  The Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer Opinion Survey conducted 
in April 2009 indicated that large fractions of banks 
continued to tighten standards and terms on loans to 
businesses and households over the preceding three 
months. For most loan categories, however, the frac-
tions of banks that reported having done so decreased 
from the January survey. The majority of respondents 
to the April survey indicated that they expected the 
credit quality of their loan portfolios to worsen over the 
remainder of the year. Demand for most types of loans 
also reportedly weakened over the survey period, with 
the noticeable exception of demand from prime borrow-
ers for mortgages to purchase homes—a development 
that coincided with a temporary rise in applications to 
reﬁ  nance home mortgages.
  Data from the February and May Surveys of Terms 
of Business Lending indicated that the spreads of yields 
on C&I loans over those on comparable-maturity mar-
ket instruments rose noticeably. The increase in the 
May survey was partly attributable to a steep increase 
in spreads on loans made under commitment, as a larger 
share of loans in the May survey were drawn from com-
mitments arranged after the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
Monetary Policy Expectations and 
Treasury Rates
The current target range for the federal funds rate, 
0 to ¼ percent, is in line with the level that investors 
expected at the end of 2008. However, over the ﬁ  rst 
half of 2009, investors marked down, on balance, their 
expectation for the path of the federal funds rate for the 
remainder of the year. Early in the year, the markdown 
was attributable to continued concerns about the health 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions, weakness in the real economy, 
and a moderation in inﬂ  ation pressures. Later in the 
period, FOMC communications indicating that the fed-
eral funds rate would likely remain low for an extended 
period reportedly also contributed to the downward 
revision to policy expectations. In contrast, investors 
marked up their expectations about the pace with which 
policy accommodation will be removed in 2010, likely 
in light of increased optimism about the economic out-
look. Futures quotes currently suggest that investors 
expect the federal funds rate to remain within the cur-
rent target range for the remainder of this year and then 
to rise in 2010. However, uncertainty about the size of 
term premiums and potential distortions created by the 
zero lower bound for the federal funds rate continue to 
make it difﬁ  cult to obtain a deﬁ  nitive reading on the 
policy expectations of market participants from futures 
prices. Options prices suggest that investor uncertainty 
about the future path for policy increased, on balance, 
during the ﬁ  rst half of 2009.
  Yields on longer-maturity Treasury securities 
increased substantially, on net, over the ﬁ  rst half of 
2009, in response to better-than-expected economic 
data releases, declines in the weight investors attached 
to highly adverse economic outcomes, signs of thaw-
ing in the credit markets, technical factors related to the 
hedging of mortgage holdings, and the large increase in 
the expected supply of such securities (ﬁ  gure 43). The 
rise in Treasury yields has likely been mitigated some-
what by the implementation of the Federal Reserve’s 
large-scale asset purchases, under which the Federal 
Reserve is conducting substantial purchases of agency 
debt, agency MBS, and longer-maturity Treasury secu-
rities. On net, yields on 2- and 10-year Treasury notes 
rose about 50 and 115 basis points, respectively, during 
the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, with the rise concentrated in the 
second quarter, after having declined about 200 and 
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43. Interest rates on selected Treasury securities, 2004–09  
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. 
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  In contrast to yields on their nominal counterparts, 
yields on Treasury inﬂ  ation-protected securities (TIPS) 
declined over the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, which resulted in 
a noticeable increase in measured inﬂ  ation compensa-
tion—the difference between comparable-maturity 
nominal yields and TIPS yields. Inferences about inﬂ  a-
tion expectations from inﬂ  ation compensation have 
been difﬁ  cult to make since the second half of 2008 
because yields on nominal and TIPS issues appear 
to have been affected signiﬁ  cantly by movements in 
liquidity premiums, and because other special factors 
have buffeted yields on nominal Treasury issues. Some 
of these special factors have begun to subside in recent 
months, suggesting that the increase in inﬂ  ation com-
pensation since year-end is partly due to an improve-
ment in market functioning and other special factors, 
although near-term inﬂ  ation expectations may have 
been boosted by rising energy prices. 
Monetary Aggregates and the 
Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet
The M2 monetary aggregate expanded at an annual rate 
of 7¾ percent during the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, reﬂ  ecting 
robust growth in the ﬁ  rst quarter and more moderate 
growth in the second (ﬁ  gure 44).12 This expansion was 
due in part to the relatively small difference between 
market interest rates and the rates offered on M2 assets, 
as well as an increased desire of households and ﬁ  rms 
to hold safe and liquid assets because of the ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil. Strong growth in liquid deposits was partially 
offset by rapid declines in small time deposits and retail 
money market mutual funds, as yields on the latter two 
assets dropped relative to rates on liquid deposits. The 
currency component of the money stock also increased, 
with a notable rise in the ﬁ  rst quarter that appeared to 
reﬂ  ect strong demand for U.S. banknotes from both for-
eign and domestic sources. The monetary base—essen-
tially the sum of currency in the hands of the public and 
12.  M2 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal 
Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveler’s 
checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits at commercial banks 
(excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. 
government, and foreign banks and ofﬁ  cial institutions) less cash 
items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve ﬂ  oat; 
(4) other checkable deposits (negotiable order of withdrawal, or 
NOW, accounts and automatic transfer service accounts at depository 
institutions; credit union share draft accounts; and demand deposits 
at thrift institutions); (5) savings deposits (including money market 
deposit accounts); (6) small-denomination time deposits (time depos-
its issued in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement 
account (IRA) and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and 
(7) balances in retail money market mutual funds less IRA and Keogh 
balances at money market mutual funds.
the reserve balances of depository institutions held at 
the Federal Reserve—continued to expand rapidly in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, albeit at a slower pace than in 
the second half of 2008. The expansion of the monetary 
base slowed further in the second quarter of 2009, as 
a decline in amounts outstanding under the Federal 
Reserve’s credit and liquidity programs partially offset 
the effects on reserve balances of the Federal Reserve’s 
large-scale asset purchases.
  The nontraditional monetary policy actions 
employed by the Federal Reserve since the onset of 
the current episode of ﬁ  nancial turmoil have resulted 
in a considerable expansion of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet (table 1). On December 31, 2007, prior 
to much of the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil, the Federal 
Reserve’s assets totaled nearly $920 billion, the bulk of 
which was Treasury securities. Its liabilities included 
nearly $800 billion in Federal Reserve notes (currency 
in circulation) and about $20 billion in reserve balances 
held by depository institutions.
  By December 31, 2008, after the introduction of 
several new Federal Reserve policy initiatives, assets 
had more than doubled to about $2.2 trillion. Hold-
ings of U.S. Treasury securities had declined by nearly 
one-half. At that point, the majority of Federal Reserve 
assets consisted of credit extended to depository insti-
tutions, other central banks, and primary dealers.13 
The Federal Reserve had extended about $330 billion 
in funding to the CPFF and was providing more than 
13 .  Primary dealers are broker-dealers that trade in U.S. govern-
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44. M2 growth rate, 1991–2009  
NOTE: The data extend through 2009:Q1 and are estimated for 2009:Q2.
Through 2008, the data are annual on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter
basis; the final observation refers to 2009:Q2 relative to 2008:Q4 at an annual
rate. For definition of M2, see text note 13. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.6, “Money Stock
Measures.” 26  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
$100 billion in support of certain critical institutions. 
The growth in assets was largely funded by an increase 
in reserve balances, which, at $860 billion, slightly 
exceeded currency in circulation.
 Over  the  ﬁ  rst half of this year, total Federal Reserve 
assets decreased slightly, on net, to about $2.1 trillion, 
though there were large changes in the composition of 
those assets. Holdings of Treasury securities increased 
to nearly $685 billion, and holdings of agency debt and 
MBS rose to more than $625 billion as a result of large-
scale asset purchases. Credit extended to depository 
institutions, primary dealers, and other market partici-
pants fell as market functioning improved. The decline 
importantly reﬂ  ected a decrease in foreign central 
banks’ draws on dollar liquidity swap lines and a runoff 
in credit extended through the CPFF and the Term Auc-
tion Facility (TAF). The amount of credit extended in 
support of certain critical institutions remained about 
unchanged. On the liability side, reserve balances fell 
somewhat, while currency in circulation rose.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
International Financial Markets
During most of the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, fears that 
global economic activity would spiral further down-
ward led to a sharp selloff in foreign equity markets 
and to rising spreads on foreign corporate debt. Stock 
indexes in Europe and Japan fell about 20 percent, 
and European bank shares fell more than 40 percent 
in response to weak earnings reports and rising fears 
about the exposure of many Western European banks 
to emerging Europe. Interbank funding markets were 
supported by government guarantees of bank debt and 
other policies put in place during 2008 to aid wholesale 
funding. These markets remained more stressed than 
before the ﬁ  nancial crisis, but their functioning contin-
ued to gradually improve from the serious disarray that 
occurred last fall.
  Rapidly easing monetary policies in many foreign 
economies, along with further safe-haven ﬂ  ows into 
Treasury securities, fueled continued dollar apprecia-
tion over the ﬁ  rst two months of the year. The Federal 
Reserve’s broadest measure of the nominal trade-
weighted foreign exchange value of the dollar rose 
more than 6 percent during January and February (ﬁ  g-
ure 45). However, beginning in March, the dollar depre-
ciated as the global outlook improved a bit and inves-
tors accordingly shifted away from Treasury securities 
to riskier assets abroad, reversing the pattern observed 
in the fourth quarter of 2008. During the spring, the 
dollar fell most sharply against currencies of major 
commodity-producing economies such as Australia and 
Canada, as the improvement in the global outlook also 
boosted commodity prices (ﬁ  gure 46). On net, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s broad measure of the nominal exchange 
value of the dollar is about 2 percent lower than it was 
1.  Selected components of the Federal Reserve balance sheet,  
 2007–09
Millions of dollars
Total assets ...................................................  917,922 2,240,946 2,074,822
Selected assets
  Credit extended to depository institutions 
    and  dealers
  Primary credit  ..........................................  8,620  93,769  34,743
  Term auction credit  ...................................  40,000  450,219  273,691
  Central bank liquidity swaps ....................  24,000  553,728  111,641
  Primary Dealer Credit Facility and other 
   broker-dealer  credit  ...............................  ...  37,404  0
  Credit extended to other market 
   participants
  Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
    Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility.   ... 23,765  5,469
  Net portfolio holdings of Commercial 
  Paper Funding Facility LLC .....................  ...  334,102  111,053
  Net portfolio holdings of LLCs funded 
    through the Money Market Investor 
   Funding  Facility  ....................................  ...  0  0
  Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
  Facility  ..................................................  ...  ...  30,121
  Support of critical institutions
  Net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane 
    LLC, Maiden Lane II LLC, and 
    Maiden Lane III LLC1 ...........................  ...  73,925  60,546
  Credit extended to American 
    International Group, Inc. .......................  ...  38,914  42,871
  Securities held outright
 U.S.  Treasury  securities  ............................  740,611  475,921  684,030 
  Agency debt securities..............................  0  19,708  101,701
  Agency mortgage-backed securities 
   (MBS)2 ..................................................  ...  ... 526,418
MEMO
Term Securities Lending Facility3 .................  ...  171,600  4,250
Total liabilities .............................................  881,023 2,198,794 2,025,348
Selected liabilities
  Federal Reserve notes in circulation ........  791,691  853,168  870,327
  Reserve balances of depository 
   institutions  .............................................  20,767  860,000  808,824
  U.S. Treasury, general account .................  16,120  106,123  65,234
 U.S.  Treasury,  supplemental  ﬁ  nancing 
   account  ..................................................  ...  259,325  199,939
Total capital .................................................  36,899 42,152 49,474
NOTE: LLC is a limited liability company.
1.  The Federal Reserve has extended credit to several LLCs in conjunction 
with efforts to support critical institutions. Maiden Lane LLC was formed to 
acquire certain assets of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Maiden Lane II LLC 
was formed to purchase residential mortgage-backed securities from the U.S. 
securities lending reinvestment portfolio of subsidiaries of American Interna-
tional Group, Inc. (AIG). Maiden Lane III LLC was formed to purchase multi-
sector collateralized debt obligations on which the Financial Products group of 
AIG has written credit default swap contracts. 
2.  Includes only MBS purchases that have already settled.     
3.  The Federal Reserve retains ownership of securities lent through the Term 
Securities Lending Facility.
... Not applicable.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
  Dec. 31,   Dec. 31,  July 15,
 2007  2008  2009
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at the start of the year but remains well above its mid-
2008 lows. 
  Stock markets around the world rebounded in 
the second quarter along with prospects for global 
growth (ﬁ  gure 47). Financial stocks led this rise in 
the advanced foreign economies as some large banks 
reported strong earnings growth, which beneﬁ  ted from 
the low interest rate environment. On net, headline 
European stock indexes are now about where they 
were at the start of the year. Equity prices in the emerg-
ing market economies, which were helped both by the 
improved outlook and by an increased willingness 
on the part of investors to hold riskier assets, are now 
20 to 75 percent higher than at the start of the year 
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45. U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate, broad index,  
2005–09  
NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for the series is July 15, 2009. The broad index is a
weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against
the currencies of a large group of the most important U.S. trading partners.
The index weights, which change over time, are derived from U.S. export
shares and from U.S. and foreign import shares. 
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46. U.S. dollar exchange rate against selected major  
currencies, 2007–09  
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NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for each series is July 15, 2009. 
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47. Equity indexes in selected advanced foreign economies, 
2007–09  
Canada
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NOTE: The data are daily. The last observation for each series is July 15,
2009. Because the Tokyo Exchange was closed on December 31, 2007, the
Japan index is scaled so that the December 28, 2007, closing value equals
100. 
SOURCE: For euro area, Dow Jones Euro STOXX Index; for Canada,
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index; for Japan, Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TOPIX); and for the United Kingdom, London Stock Exchange
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NOTE: The data are daily. The last observation for each series is July 15,
2009. Because the Shanghai Stock Exchange was closed on December 31,
2007, the China index is scaled so that the December 28, 2007, closing value
equals 100. The Latin American economies are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The emerging Asian economies are China,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Thailand. 
SOURCE: For Latin America and emerging Asia, Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) index; for China, Shanghai Composite Index, as
reported by Bloomberg. 28  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
  The decisions of several foreign central banks to 
engage in nontraditional monetary policies appeared 
to have some effect on longer-term interest rates (ﬁ  g-
ure 49). Yields on long-term British gilts fell 60 basis 
points around the March 5 announcement by the Bank 
of England that it would begin purchasing government 
securities, and yields on European covered bonds fell 
nearly 30 basis points over the week following the 
May 7 announcement by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) that it would purchase covered bonds. However, 
as the economic outlook improved some in the sec-
ond quarter, and amid concerns about mounting ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cits and debts, yields on nominal benchmark bonds 
rose. On balance, nominal benchmark bond yields in 
major foreign countries are higher than at the start of 
the year, even as yields on inﬂ  ation-protected bonds 
have fallen. 
The Financial Account
The pattern of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows between the United States 
and the rest of the world was strongly affected by the 
intensiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial turmoil in the fall of 2008 
and, more recently, by the easing of strains in ﬁ  nancial 
markets (ﬁ  gure 50). In the second half of 2008, U.S. 
investors withdrew to some extent from foreign secu-
rities, and foreigners slowed their purchases of U.S. 
assets. At the same time, foreigners noticeably shifted 
their purchases away from U.S. corporate and agency 
securities and toward safer U.S. Treasury securities (ﬁ  g-
ure 51). For 2008 as a whole, the size of the purchases 
of U.S. Treasury securities by foreigners was unprec-
edented, nearly doubling the previous record. 
  The pattern of ﬂ  ows has normalized somewhat this 
year. The pace of private foreign net Treasury purchases 
slowed in the ﬁ  rst quarter, and in April ﬂ  ows turned to 
net sales, primarily of short-term Treasury securities, 
signaling some reversal of the ﬂ  ight to safety. For-
eign demand for most other U.S. securities, however, 
remained extremely weak throughout the ﬁ  rst part of 
2009. Foreigners continued to sell U.S. corporate and 
agency securities through April, although they did show 
renewed interest in U.S. corporate stocks in March, 
April, and particularly May. 
 Foreign  ofﬁ  cial institutions resumed strong net 
purchases of U.S. assets in the ﬁ  rst several months of 
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50. U.S. net financial inflows, 2004–09  
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NOTE: U.S. official flows include foreign central banks’ drawings on their
swap lines with the Federal Reserve. 
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51. Net foreign purchases of U.S. securities, 2004–09  
Q1
NOTE: Other U.S. securities include corporate equities and bonds, agency
bonds, and municipal bonds. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Treasury securities. This development followed net 
sales in the fourth quarter of 2008 as some countries 
sold reserves to support their currencies; although for-
eign ofﬁ  cial institutions made large net purchases of 
Treasury securities, they sold larger amounts of other 
U.S. assets. Foreign ofﬁ  cial acquisitions of Treasury 
securities were concentrated in short-term bills for 
some months during the winter, but ofﬁ  cial acquisitions 
of long-term notes and bonds have been similar to those 
of bills over the period since February. 
  Resumption of portfolio investment abroad by U.S. 
investors in 2009 also pointed to reduced risk aver-
sion in ﬁ  nancial markets. Following unprecedented net 
inﬂ  ows in this category in 2008 resulting from U.S. 
residents bringing home their foreign investments, out-
ﬂ  ows resumed in early 2009 as U.S. investors returned 
to net purchases of foreign securities (ﬁ  gure 52). 
Finally, starting this year, improvements in the tone of 
interbank funding markets led to a resumption of net 
lending abroad by U.S. banks after a sharp contraction 
of lending in the fourth quarter. As private sources of 
dollar liquidity reemerged, foreign banks were able to 
repay the loans they had received from their central 
banks. These foreign central banks, in turn, reduced 
the outstanding amounts of U.S. dollars drawn on swap 
lines from the Federal Reserve.
Advanced Foreign Economies
The contraction of economic activity in the major 
advanced foreign economies deepened in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter, as ﬁ  nancial turbulence, shrinking world trade, 
adverse wealth effects, and eroding business and con-
sumer conﬁ  dence continued to weigh on activity. GDP 
fell particularly sharply in Germany and Japan, which 
were hit hard by a contraction in manufacturing exports. 
Domestic demand plummeted across the advanced 
foreign economies, with double-digit declines in invest-
ment spending and sizable negative contributions of 
inventories to economic growth. Housing markets also 
continued to weaken in the ﬁ  rst quarter, with prices 
and building activity declining. By the second quarter, 
however, monthly indicators of economic activity in 
these economies began to show some moderation in the 
pace of contraction. Purchasing managers indexes and 
surveys of business conﬁ  dence rebounded in the second 
quarter from the exceptionally low levels reached in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter, while industrial production stabilized 
somewhat.
  Twelve-month consumer price inﬂ  ation continued 
to decline during the ﬁ  rst half of the year, driven down 
by the fall in oil and other commodity prices since mid-
2008 and the signiﬁ  cant increase in economic slack 
(ﬁ  gure 53). Headline inﬂ  ation fell to near or below zero 
in all major economies except the United Kingdom, 
where the depreciation of the pound late last year con-
tributed to keeping inﬂ  ation around 2 percent. Exclud-
ing food and energy prices, the slowing in consumer 
prices in these economies was more limited. 
  Foreign central banks responded to worsening eco-
nomic conditions and reduced inﬂ  ation by aggressively 
cutting policy rates and, in some cases, initiating uncon-
ventional monetary easing. The ECB and Bank of Eng-
land each reduced its key policy rate 150 basis points 
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52. Net U.S. purchases of foreign securities, 2004–09  
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NOTE: Negative numbers indicate a balance-of-payments outflow
associated with positive U.S. purchases of foreign securities. 
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53. Change in consumer prices for major foreign  
economies, 2005–09  
Canada
NOTE: The data are monthly, and the percent change is from one year
earlier. The data extend through June 2009 for the euro area and the United
Kingdom and May 2009 for Japan and Canada. 
SOURCE: Haver Analytics. 30  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
lowered its rate 125 basis points (ﬁ  gure 54). The Bank 
of Japan, which had already cut the overnight uncol-
lateralized call rate to 10 basis points, kept rates at that 
minimal level. As policy rates fell to very low levels, 
central banks implemented nontraditional policies to 
provide further support to activity. The Bank of Eng-
land established an Asset Purchase Facility to purchase 
up to £125 billion in government and corporate debt; 
the Bank of Japan announced that it would increase its 
purchase of Japanese government bonds, including 
longer-term bonds, and would purchase commercial 
paper outright; and the ECB announced plans to pur-
chase as much as €60 billion in covered bonds over 
the next year and conducted its ﬁ  rst one-year ﬁ  nancing 
operations on June 24, allocating €442 billion.
Emerging Market Economies
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis took its toll on the emerging 
market economies as well. After falling steeply in the 
fourth quarter, economic activity contracted sharply 
again in the ﬁ  rst quarter. However, recent data on busi-
ness sentiment, production, and retail sales suggest that 
economic activity may be starting to recover.
  Among the larger developing economies, only China 
and India have maintained positive growth during the 
global slowdown. Chinese growth was supported in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter and boosted signiﬁ  cantly further in 
the second quarter by a large ﬁ  scal stimulus package, 
which focused on infrastructure investment, and by an 
enormous jump in credit growth. India’s economy also 
was supported by ﬁ  scal stimulus and was relatively 
insulated from the negative global shock because it is 
less open. Elsewhere in emerging Asia, the economies 
of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Tai-
wan, and Thailand all contracted at double-digit annual 
rates in at least one quarter, in line with their deep trade 
and ﬁ  nancial linkages with the global economy. More 
recently, however, indicators such as industrial produc-
tion have turned up in some of these countries. In addi-
tion, exports, although they remain weak, have edged 
higher in some countries, partly because of stimulus-
driven demand from China. 
  Economic activity in Mexico contracted sharply late 
last year and again in the ﬁ  rst quarter, owing largely to 
Mexico’s strong ties to the United States. The outbreak 
of the H1N1 virus was a signiﬁ  cant drag on Mexican 
economic activity in the second quarter. In addition, the 
economies of Mexico and some other Latin American 
countries continued to be negatively affected by the 
sharp fall in commodity prices in the second half of last 
year. However, as in Asia, industrial production in sev-
eral Latin American countries has recently turned high-
er. In Brazil, the automobile sector, which has received 
government support, appears to have led a rebound in 
output.
  Several countries in emerging Europe continued to 
experience intense ﬁ  nancial stress and sharp economic 
contractions in the ﬁ  rst quarter, with activity declining 
at an especially precipitous rate in Latvia. The region 
has faced external ﬁ  nancing difﬁ  culties as a result of 
large external imbalances and high dependence on 
foreign capital ﬂ  ows. Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and 
Ukraine are among the countries that have received 
ofﬁ  cial assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund. 
  As the global economy has slowed, inﬂ  ation in 
emerging market economies has diminished. Inﬂ  ation in 
emerging Asia has decreased signiﬁ  cantly, especially in 
China where consumer prices in June were below their 
year-earlier levels. Reduced price pressures and weak 
economic growth prompted signiﬁ  cant monetary easing 
in several Asian emerging market economies. Inﬂ  a-
tion in Latin America has fallen less sharply. Notably, 
Mexican inﬂ  ation remains near its recent high, due in 
part to pass-through from the peso’s depreciation earlier 
this year. In these circumstances, monetary easing has 
taken place in Latin America, but nominal interest rates 
remain somewhat higher than in Asia. Many emerging 
market economies have undertaken ﬁ  scal stimulus this 
year, although the degree has varied and all stimulus 
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 15, 2009. The data
shown are, for Canada, the overnight rate; for the euro area, the minimum bid
rate on main refinancing operations; for Japan, the call money rate; and, for
the United Kingdom, the official bank rate paid on commercial reserves. 
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Part 3 
Monetary Policy: Recent Developments and 
Outlook
Monetary Policy over the First Half of 2009
Over the second half of 2008, the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (FOMC) eased the stance of monetary 
policy by decreasing its target for the federal funds rate 
from 2 percent to a range between 0 and ¼ percent and 
took a number of additional actions to increase liquidity 
and improve the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets (ﬁ  gure 
55). During the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, the FOMC maintained 
its target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to ¼ per-
cent, and it extended and modiﬁ  ed the nontraditional 
policy actions taken previously.
  The data reviewed at the January 27–28 FOMC 
meeting indicated a continued sharp contraction in 
economic activity. The housing market remained on a 
steep downward trajectory, consumer spending contin-
ued its signiﬁ  cant decline, the slowdown in business 
equipment investment intensiﬁ  ed, and foreign demand 
had weakened. Conditions in the labor market had con-
tinued to deteriorate rapidly, and the drop in industrial 
production had accelerated. Headline consumer prices 
fell in November and December, reﬂ  ecting declines in 
consumer energy prices; core consumer prices were 
about ﬂ  at in those months. Although credit conditions 
generally had remained tight, some ﬁ  nancial markets—
particularly those that were receiving support from 
Federal Reserve liquidity facilities and other govern-
ment actions—exhibited modest signs of improvement. 
Meeting participants—Federal Reserve Board gover-
nors and Federal Reserve Bank presidents—anticipated 
that a gradual recovery in U.S. economic activity would 
begin in the second half of the year in response to mon-
etary easing, additional ﬁ  scal stimulus, relatively low 
energy prices, and continued efforts by the government 
to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial sector and increase the avail-
ability of credit. Committee members agreed that 
keeping the target range for the federal funds rate at 
0 to ¼ percent would be appropriate. In its Janu-
ary statement, the FOMC reiterated that the Federal 
Reserve would use all available tools to promote the 
resumption of sustainable economic growth and to pre-
serve price stability. The Committee also stated that, in 
addition to the purchases of agency debt and mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) already under way, it was 
prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury securities if 
evolving circumstances indicated that such transactions 
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would be particularly effective in improving conditions 
in private credit markets. The Committee indicated 
that it would continue to monitor carefully the size and 
composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
in light of evolving ﬁ  nancial market developments. It 
would also continue to assess whether expansions of, or 
modiﬁ  cations to, lending facilities would serve to fur-
ther support credit markets and economic activity and 
help preserve price stability.
  On February 7, 2009, the Committee met by confer-
ence call in a joint session with the Board of Governors 
to discuss the potential role of the Federal Reserve in 
the Treasury’s forthcoming Financial Stability Plan. The 
Federal Reserve’s primary direct role in the plan would 
be through an expansion of the previously announced 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), 
which would be supported by additional funds from the 
Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). It 
was anticipated that such an expansion would provide 
additional assistance to ﬁ  nancial markets and institu-
tions in meeting the credit needs of households and 
businesses and thus would support overall economic 
activity.
  At the March FOMC meeting, nearly all participants 
indicated that economic conditions had deteriorated 
relative to their expectations at the time of the January 
meeting. Economic activity continued to fall sharply, 
with widespread declines in payroll employment and 
industrial production. Consumer spending had remained 
ﬂ  at at a low level, the housing market weakened further, 
and nonresidential construction fell. Business spending 
on equipment and software had continued to decline 
across a broad range of categories. Despite the cutbacks 
in production, inventory overhangs appeared to have 
worsened in a number of areas. Of particular note was 
the sharp fall in foreign economic activity, which was 
having a negative effect on U.S. exports. Both headline 
and core consumer prices had edged up in January and 
February. Credit conditions remained very tight, and 
ﬁ  nancial markets continued to be fragile and unsettled, 
with pressures on ﬁ  nancial institutions generally having 
intensiﬁ  ed over the past few months. Overall, partici-
pants expressed concern about downside risks to an 
outlook for activity that was already weak. Nonethe-
less, looking beyond the very near term, participants 
saw a number of market forces and policies then in 
place as eventually leading to economic recovery. Nota-
bly, the low level of mortgage interest rates, reduced 
house prices, and the Administration’s new programs 
to encourage mortgage reﬁ  nancing and mitigate fore-
closures ultimately could bring about a lower cost of 
homeownership, a sustained increase in home sales, and 
a stabilization of house prices.
  In light of the deterioration in the economic situation 
and outlook, Committee members agreed that substan-
tial additional purchases of longer-term assets would 
be appropriate. In its March statement, the Committee 
announced that, to provide greater support to mortgage 
lending and housing markets, it would increase the 
size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by 
purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency 
MBS, bringing its total purchases of these securities to 
up to $1.25 trillion in 2009, and that it would increase 
its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 bil-
lion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help 
improve conditions in private credit markets, the Com-
mittee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-
term Treasury securities over the next six months. The 
Committee decided to maintain the target range for 
the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and noted in 
its March statement that it anticipated that economic 
conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. 
The Committee also noted that the Federal Reserve had 
launched the TALF to facilitate the extension of credit 
to households and small businesses, and it anticipated 
that the range of eligible collateral for this facility was 
likely to be expanded to include other ﬁ  nancial assets. 
The Committee stated that it would continue to care-
fully monitor the size and composition of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet in light of evolving ﬁ  nancial 
and economic developments.
  On March 23, the Federal Reserve and the Treas-
ury issued a joint statement on the role of the Federal 
Reserve in preserving ﬁ  nancial and monetary stability. 
In the statement, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
agreed to continue to cooperate on measures to improve 
the stability and functioning of the ﬁ  nancial system 
while minimizing the associated credit risk to the Fed-
eral Reserve and preserving the ability of the Federal 
Reserve to achieve its monetary policy objectives. The 
two government entities also agreed to work together 
with the Congress on a comprehensive resolution 
regime for systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
and the Treasury promised to remove the emergency 
loans for systemically important institutions from the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet over time to the extent 
its authorities permit.
  At the FOMC meeting on April 28 and 29, partici-
pants noted that the pace of decline in some compo-
nents of ﬁ  nal demand appeared to have slowed. Con-
sumer spending ﬁ  rmed in the ﬁ  rst quarter after dropping 
markedly during the second half of 2008. Housing 
activity remained depressed but seemed to have lev-
eled off in February and March. In contrast, businesses 
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recent months—reﬂ  ecting, in part, inventory overhangs 
that had persisted into the early part of the year—and 
ﬁ  xed investment continued to contract. Headline and 
core consumer prices rose at a moderate pace over the 
ﬁ  rst three months of the year. Participants noted that 
ﬁ  nancial market conditions had generally strengthened, 
and surveys and anecdotal reports pointed to a pickup 
in household and business conﬁ  dence, which nonethe-
less remained at very low levels. Yields on Treasury 
and agency securities had fallen after the release of the 
March FOMC statement, which noted the increase in 
planned purchases of longer-term securities. However, 
this initial drop was subsequently reversed amid the 
improved economic outlook, an easing of concerns 
about ﬁ  nancial institutions, and perhaps some unwind-
ing of ﬂ  ight-to-quality ﬂ  ows. Participants anticipated 
that the acceleration in ﬁ  nal demand and economic 
activity over the next few quarters would be modest, 
with growth of consumption expenditures likely to be 
restrained and business investment spending probably 
shrinking further. Looking further ahead, participants 
considered a number of factors that would be likely to 
restrain the pace of economic recovery over the medi-
um term. Strains in credit markets were expected to 
recede only gradually as ﬁ  nancial institutions continued 
to rebuild their capital and remained cautious in their 
approach to asset-liability management, especially giv-
en that the outlook for credit performance would prob-
ably remain weak. Households would likely continue 
to be cautious, and their desired saving rates would be 
relatively high over the extended period that would be 
required to bring their wealth back up to more normal 
levels relative to income. The stimulus from ﬁ  scal pol-
icy was expected to diminish over time as the govern-
ment budget moved to a sustainable path. Demand for 
U.S. exports would also take time to revive, reﬂ  ecting 
the gradual recovery of economic activity in our major 
trading partners. 
  Against this backdrop, the FOMC indicated that it 
would maintain the target range for the federal funds 
rate at 0 to ¼ percent and anticipated that economic 
conditions would be likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. 
The Committee reiterated that, to provide support to 
mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve 
overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal 
Reserve would purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion 
of agency MBS and up to $200 billion of agency debt 
by the end of the year. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
would buy up to $300 billion of Treasury securities 
by autumn. The Committee would continue to evalu-
ate the timing and overall amounts of its purchases of 
securities in light of the evolving economic outlook and 
conditions in ﬁ  nancial markets. The Federal Reserve 
was facilitating the extension of credit to households 
and businesses and supporting the functioning of ﬁ  nan-
cial markets through a range of liquidity programs. The 
Committee indicated that it would continue to care-
fully monitor the size and composition of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet in light of ﬁ  nancial and eco-
nomic developments. 
  The information reviewed at the June 23–24 FOMC 
meeting suggested that the economy remained weak, 
though declines in activity seemed to be lessening. 
Consumer spending appeared to have stabilized, sales 
and starts of new homes ﬂ  attened out, and the recent 
declines in capital spending did not look as severe as 
those that had occurred around the turn of the year. At 
the same time, labor markets and industrial produc-
tion continued to deteriorate sharply. Apart from a 
tax-induced jump in tobacco prices, consumer price 
inﬂ  ation was fairly quiescent in recent months, although 
an upturn in energy prices appeared likely to boost 
headline inﬂ  ation in June. Conditions and sentiment 
in ﬁ  nancial markets had continued to show signs of 
improvement since the last meeting. The results of 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 
were positively received by ﬁ  nancial markets, credit 
default swap spreads of banking organizations declined 
considerably, and the institutions involved in the SCAP 
were subsequently able to issue signiﬁ  cant amounts of 
public equity and nonguaranteed debt. The functioning 
of short-term funding markets improved, broad stock 
price indexes increased, and spreads on corporate bonds 
continued to narrow. Nominal Treasury yields climbed 
steeply, reﬂ  ecting investors’ perceptions of an improved 
economic outlook, a reversal of ﬂ  ight-to-quality ﬂ  ows, 
and technical factors related to the hedging of mortgage 
holdings.
  In its June statement, the FOMC reiterated that it 
would employ all available tools to promote economic 
recovery and preserve price stability. It noted that it 
would maintain its target range for the federal funds 
rate at 0 to ¼ percent and continued to anticipate that 
economic conditions would likely warrant exception-
ally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended 
period. The FOMC indicated that, as it had previously 
announced, to provide support to mortgage lending and 
housing markets and to improve overall conditions in 
private credit markets, the Federal Reserve would pur-
chase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of agency MBS and 
up to $200 billion of agency debt by the end of the year. 
In addition, the Federal Reserve would buy up to $300 
billion of Treasury securities by autumn. The Commit-
tee noted that it would continue to evaluate the timing 
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has further discussion related to the evolution of these 
programs.
 Over  the  ﬁ  rst half of the year, the Federal Reserve 
also undertook a number of initiatives to improve com-
munications about its policy actions. These initiatives 
are described more fully in the box titled “Federal 
Reserve Initiatives to Increase Transparency.”
Monetary Policy as the Economy Recovers
At present, the focus of monetary policy is on stimulat-
ing economic activity in order to limit the degree to 
which the economy falls short of full employment and 
to prevent a sustained decline in inﬂ  ation below levels 
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s legislated objec-
tives. Economic conditions are likely to warrant accom-
modative monetary policy for an extended period. At 
some point, however, economic recovery will take hold, 
labor market conditions will improve, and the down-
ward pressures on inﬂ  ation will diminish. When this 
process has advanced sufﬁ  ciently, the stance of policy 
will need to be tightened to prevent inﬂ  ation from rising 
above levels consistent with price stability and to keep 
economic activity near its maximum sustainable level. 
The FOMC is conﬁ  dent that it has the necessary tools 
to withdraw policy accommodation, when such action 
becomes appropriate, in a smooth and timely manner.
  Monetary policy actions taken over the past year 
have led to a considerable increase in the assets held 
by the Federal Reserve. This increase in assets reﬂ  ects 
both the expansion of Federal Reserve liquidity facili-
ties and the purchases of longer-term securities. On the 
margin, the extension of credit and acquisition of assets 
light of the evolving economic outlook and conditions 
in ﬁ  nancial markets. The FOMC also stated that the 
Federal Reserve was monitoring the size and composi-
tion of its balance sheet and would make adjustments to 
its credit and liquidity programs as warranted.
 Conditions  in  ﬁ  nancial markets had improved nota-
bly by the end of June, although market functioning in 
many areas remained impaired and seemed likely to 
remain strained for some time. Usage of some of the 
Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs had also decreased 
in recent months. Against this backdrop, on June 25, the 
Federal Reserve announced extensions of and modiﬁ  ca-
tions to a number of its liquidity programs (see table 2 
for a summary of the changes).14 The Federal Reserve 
noted that the Board and the FOMC would continue to 
monitor closely the condition of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
the need for and effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s 
special liquidity facilities and arrangements. Should the 
recent improvements in market conditions continue, the 
Board and the FOMC anticipated that a number of the 
facilities might not need to be extended beyond Febru-
ary 1, 2010. However, if ﬁ  nancial stresses did not mod-
erate as expected, the Board and the FOMC were pre-
pared to extend the terms of some or all of the facilities 
as needed to promote ﬁ  nancial stability and economic 
growth. The public would receive timely notice of 
planned extensions, discontinuations, or modiﬁ  cations 
of Federal Reserve programs. The next section of this 
report, “Monetary Policy as the Economy Recovers,” 
14.  For more details, see Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2009), “Federal Reserve Announces Extensions 
of and Modiﬁ  cations to a Number of Its Liquidity Programs,” 
press release, June 25, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20090625a.htm.
2. Extensions and modiﬁ  cations of Federal Reserve liquidity programs
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) ...................  Extended to February 1, 2010 
Central bank swap lines .................................................  Extended to February 1, 2010 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility ..............................  Extended to February 1, 2010 
Money Market Investor Funding Facility ......................  Expiration date remains at October 30, 2009 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility .......................................  Extended to February 1, 2010 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility .................  Expiration date remains at December 31, 2009 
Term Auction Facility ....................................................  No ﬁ  xed expiration date 
Term Securities Lending Facility ...................................  Extended to February 1, 2010 
  …   Not applicable.
 S OURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
  Liquidity program   Extension   Modiﬁ  cation
Money market mutual funds have to experience 
material outﬂ  ows before being able to sell asset-
backed commercial paper that would be eligible 






Auction amounts reduced initially to $125 billion.
Auctions backed by Schedule 1 collateral sus-
pended effective July 1, 2009. Auctions backed by 
Schedule 2 collateral now conducted every four 
weeks. Total amount offered reduced initially to 
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by the Federal Reserve has been funded by crediting 
the reserve accounts of depository institutions (hence-
forth referred to as banks). Thus, the increase in Federal 
Reserve assets has been associated with substantial 
growth in banks’ reserve balances, leaving the level 
of reserves far above that typically observed when 
short-term interest rates were signiﬁ  cantly greater than 
zero. 
  To some extent, a contraction in the stock of reserve 
balances will occur automatically as ﬁ  nancial condi-
tions improve. In particular, most of the liquidity facili-
ties deployed by the Federal Reserve in the current 
period of ﬁ  nancial turmoil are priced at a premium over 
normal interest rate spreads or have a minimum bid rate 
that is high enough to make them unattractive under 
normal market conditions. Thus, the sizes of these 
programs, as well as the stock of reserve balances they 
create, will tend to diminish automatically as ﬁ  nan-
cial strains abate. Indeed, as noted elsewhere in this 
report, total credit extended to banks and other market 
participants (excluding support of critical institutions) 
declined from about $1.5 trillion as of December 31, 
2008, to less than $600 billion as of July 15, 2009, as 
ﬁ  nancial conditions improved. In addition, redemp-
tions of the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt, 
agency MBS, and longer-term Treasury securities are 
expected to occur at a rate of $100 billion to $200 bil-
lion per year over the next few years, leading to further 
reductions in reserve balances.
  But even after lending facilities have wound down 
and holdings of long-term assets have begun to run off, 
the volume of assets on the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet may remain very large for some time. Without 
additional actions, the level of bank reserves would 
continue to remain elevated as well. 
  Despite continued large holdings of assets, the Fed-
eral Reserve will have at its disposal two broad means 
of tightening monetary policy at the appropriate time. 
In principle, either of these methods would sufﬁ  ce to 
raise short-term interest rates; however, to ensure effec-
tiveness, the two methods will most likely be used in 
combination.
  Federal Reserve Initiatives to Increase Transparency
The Federal Reserve took a number of nontradi-
tional policy actions during the current episode 
of financial turmoil. In late 2008, Chairman 
Bernanke asked Vice Chairman Kohn to lead a 
review of how Federal Reserve disclosure poli-
cies should be adapted to make more informa-
tion about these programs available to the public 
and to the Congress. A guiding principle of 
the review was that the Federal Reserve would 
seek to provide to the public as much informa-
tion and analysis as possible, consistent with its 
objectives of promoting maximum employment 
and price stability. The Federal Reserve subse-
quently created a separate section of its website 
devoted to providing data, explanations, and 
analyses of its lending programs and balance 
sheet.1 Postings in the first half of 2009 included 
additional explanatory material and details about 
a number of Federal Reserve credit and liquidity 
programs, the annual financial statements of the 
12 Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Gover-
nors, and the limited liability companies (LLCs) 
created in 2008 to avert the disorderly failures of 
The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., and American 
International Group, Inc., as well as the most 
1.  This section of the Board’s website is available at www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm.
recent reports to the Congress on the Federal 
Reserve’s emergency lending programs. 
  On June 10, the Federal Reserve issued the 
first of a series of monthly reports to provide 
more information on its credit and liquidity pro-
grams.2 For many of those programs, the new 
information provided in the report includes the 
number of borrowers and the amounts borrowed 
by type of institution, collateral by type and 
credit rating, and data on the concentration of 
borrowing. The report also includes information 
on liquidity swap usage by country, quarterly 
income earned on different classes of Federal 
Reserve assets, and asset distribution and other 
information on the LLCs. In addition, the report 
summarizes and discusses recent developments 
across a number of Federal Reserve programs. In 
addition to the new report, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York recently made available the 
investment management agreements related to 
its financial stability and liquidity activities.3 
2.  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2009), Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and 
Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet (Washington: Board 
of Governors, July), www.federalreserve.gov/files/monthlyclb-
sreport200907.pdf.
3.  Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2009), “Vendor Infor-
mation,” www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/vendor_informa-
tion.html.36  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
 The  ﬁ  rst method for tightening monetary policy 
relies on the authority that the Congress granted to the 
Federal Reserve last fall to pay interest on the balances 
maintained by banks. By raising the rate it pays on 
banks’ reserve balances, the Federal Reserve will be 
able to tighten monetary policy by inducing increases 
in the federal funds rate and other short-term market 
interest rates. In general, banks will not supply funds to 
the money market at an interest rate lower than the rate 
they can earn risk free at the Federal Reserve. More-
over, they should compete to borrow any funds that are 
offered in the market at rates below the rate of interest 
paid by the Federal Reserve, as such borrowing allows 
them to earn a spread without any risk. Thus, raising 
the interest rate paid on balances that banks hold at the 
Federal Reserve should provide a powerful upward 
inﬂ  uence on short-term market interest rates, including 
the federal funds rate, without the need to drain reserve 
balances. A number of foreign central banks have been 
able to maintain overnight interbank interest rates at or 
above the level of interest paid on bank reserves even in 
the presence of unusually high levels of reserve balanc-
es (see the box titled “Foreign Experience with Interest 
on Reserves”).
  Despite this logic, the federal funds rate has been 
somewhat lower than the rate of interest banks earn on 
reserve balances; the gap was especially noticeable in 
October and November 2008, when payment of inter-
est on reserves ﬁ  rst began. This gap appears to have 
reﬂ  ected several factors: First, the Federal Reserve is 
not allowed to pay interest on balances held by non-
depository institutions, including some large lenders 
in the federal funds market such as the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Such institutions may 
have an incentive to lend at rates below the rate that 
banks receive on reserve balances. Second, the pay-
ment of interest on reserves was a new policy at the 
time that the gap was particularly noticeable, and banks 
may not have had time to adjust their operations to the 
new regime. Third, the unusually strained conditions 
in ﬁ  nancial markets at that time may have reduced the 
willingness of banks to arbitrage by borrowing in the 
federal funds market at rates below the rate paid on 
reserve balances and earning a higher rate by increas-
ing their deposits at the Federal Reserve. The latter 
two factors are not likely to persist, particularly as the 
economy and ﬁ  nancial markets recover. Moreover, if, as 
the economy recovers, large-scale lending in the federal 
funds market by nondepository institutions threatens to 
hold the federal funds rate below its target, the Federal 
Reserve has various options to deal with the problem. 
For example, it could offer these institutions the option 
of investing in reverse repurchase agreements. Under 
these transactions, the Federal Reserve sells securities 
from its portfolio, thereby removing funds from the 
market, and agrees to buy back the securities at a later 
date.15 Eliminating the incentive of nondepository insti-
tutions to lend their excess funds into short-term money 
markets would help ensure that raising the rate of inter-
est paid on reserves would raise the federal funds rate 
and tighten monetary conditions even if the level of 
reserve balances were to remain high. 
  The second method for tightening monetary policy, 
despite a high level of assets on the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet, is to take steps to reduce the overall level 
of reserve balances. Policymakers have several options 
for reducing the level of reserve balances should such 
action be desired. First, the Federal Reserve could 
engage in large-scale reverse repurchase agreements 
with ﬁ  nancial market participants, including the GSEs 
as well as other institutions. Reverse repurchase agree-
ments are a traditional tool of Federal Reserve mon-
etary policy implementation. Second, the Treasury 
could sell more bills and deposit the proceeds with the 
Federal Reserve. The Treasury has been conducting 
such operations since last fall; the resulting deposits are 
reported on the Federal Reserve balance sheet as the 
Supplementary Financing Account. One limitation on 
this option is that the associated Treasury debt is subject 
to the statutory debt ceiling. Also, to preserve monetary 
policy independence, the Federal Reserve must ensure 
that it can achieve its policy objectives without reliance 
on the Treasury if necessary. A third option is for the 
Federal Reserve to offer banks the opportunity to hold 
some of their balances as term deposits. Such deposits 
would pay interest but would not have the liquidity and 
transactions features of reserve balances. Term deposits 
could not be counted toward reserve requirements, nor 
could they be used to avoid overnight overdraft penal-
ties in reserve accounts.16 Each of these three policy 
options would allow a tightening of monetary policy by 
draining reserve balances and raising short-term interest 
rates. As noted earlier, measures to drain reserves will 
likely be used in conjunction with increases in the inter-
est rate paid on reserves to tighten conditions in short-
term money markets.
15.  These transactions are referred to as reverse repurchase agree-
ments to distinguish them from repurchase agreements in which the 
Federal Reserve is the investor.
16.  To be successful, especially in a period of rising interest rates, 
such deposits likely would have to pay rates of interest above the 
overnight rate on reserve balances. To prevent banks from earning 
risk-free proﬁ  ts by borrowing from the Federal Reserve and investing 
the proceeds in term deposits, the rate of remuneration on term depos-
its would have to be kept lower than the rates the Federal Reserve 
charges on its lending facilities, such as the discount window.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  37
  Raising the rate of interest on reserve balances and 
draining reserves through the options just described 
would allow policy to be tightened even if the level of 
assets on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet remained 
very high. In addition, the Federal Reserve retains the 
option to reduce its stock of assets by selling off a por-
tion of its holdings of longer-term securities before 
they mature. Asset sales by the Federal Reserve would 
serve to raise short-term interest rates and tighten mon-
etary policy by reducing the level of reserve balances; 
in addition, such sales could put upward pressure on 
longer-term interest rates by expanding the supply of 
longer-term assets available to investors. In an envi-
ronment of strengthening economic activity and rising 
  Foreign Experience with Interest on Reserves
Paying interest on excess reserve balances, 
either directly or by allowing banks to place 
excess balances into an interest-bearing account, 
is a standard tool used by major foreign central 
banks. Many have used interest on reserves, in 
combination with other tools, to maintain a floor 
under overnight interbank interest rates both in 
normal circumstances and during the period of 
financial turmoil. The European Central Bank 
(ECB), for example, has long allowed banks to 
place excess reserves into a deposit facility that 
pays interest at a rate below the ECB’s main 
refinancing rate (its bellwether policy rate). 
The quantity of funds that banks hold in that 
facility increased sharply as the ECB expanded 
its liquidity-providing operations last fall and 
has remained well above pre-crisis levels; as a 
result, the euro-area overnight interbank rate fell 
from a level close to the main refinancing rate 
toward the rate the ECB pays on deposits—but, 
importantly, not below that rate. Since Novem-
ber 2008, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) on a tempo-
rary basis has paid interest on excess reserve 
balances, at a rate of 10 basis points per year, 
which is also its current target for the overnight 
uncollateralized call rate; the BOJ noted that its 
action was intended to keep the call rate close 
to the targeted level as it supplied additional 
liquidity to the banking system. Indeed, the 
overnight rate has traded near 10 basis points 
in recent months, even as reserve balances at 
the BOJ have risen substantially, returning to 
their level during much of 2002, when the BOJ 
was implementing its Quantitative Easing Policy 
and the call rate was trading at 1 basis point 
or below. The Bank of Canada and the Bank of 
England also have used their standing deposit 
facilities to help manage interbank interest rates.
inﬂ  ation pressures, broad-based increases in interest 
rates could facilitate the achievement of the Federal 
Reserve’s dual mandate.
  In short, the Federal Reserve has a wide range of 
tools that can be used to tighten the stance of monetary 
policy at the point that the economic outlook calls for 
such action. However, economic conditions are not 
likely to warrant a tightening of monetary policy for 
an extended period. The timing and pace of any future 
tightening, together with the mix of tools employed, 
will be calibrated to best foster the Federal Reserve’s 
dual objectives of maximum employment and price 
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Part 4
Summary of Economic Projections
The following material appeared as an addendum to 
the minutes of the June 23–24, 2009, meeting of the 
Federal Open Market Committee.
In conjunction with the June 23–24, 2009, FOMC 
meeting, the members of the Board of Governors and 
the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, all of 
whom participate in deliberations of the FOMC, sub-
mitted projections for output growth, unemployment, 
and inﬂ  ation in 2009, 2010, 2011, and over the longer 
run. Projections were based on information available 
through the end of the meeting and on each participant’s 
assumptions about factors likely to affect economic 
outcomes, including his or her assessment of appropri-
ate monetary policy. “Appropriate monetary policy” is 
deﬁ  ned as the future path of policy that the participant 
deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic 
activity and inﬂ  ation that best satisfy his or her interpre-
tation of the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maxi-
mum employment and stable prices. Longer-run projec-
tions represent each participant’s assessment of the rate 
to which each variable would be expected to converge 
over time under appropriate monetary policy and in the 
absence of further shocks.
  FOMC participants generally expected that, after 
declining over the ﬁ  rst half of this year, output would 
expand sluggishly over the remainder of the year. 
Consequently, as indicated in table 1 and depicted in 
ﬁ  gure 1, all FOMC participants projected that real 
gross domestic product (GDP) would contract over the 
entirety of this year and that the unemployment rate 
would increase in coming quarters. All participants 
also expected that overall inﬂ  ation would be somewhat 
slower this year than in recent years, and most pro-
jected that core inﬂ  ation would edge down this year. 
Almost all participants viewed the near-term outlook 
for domestic output as having improved modestly rela-
tive to the projections they made at the time of the April 
FOMC meeting, reﬂ  ecting both a slightly less severe 
contraction in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 and a moderately 
stronger, but still sluggish, recovery in the second half. 
With the strong adverse forces that have been acting on 
the economy likely to abate only slowly, participants 
generally expected the recovery to be gradual in 2010. 
Even though all participants had raised their near-term 
outlook for real GDP, in light of incoming data on labor 
markets, they increased their projections for the path of 
the unemployment rate from those published in April. 
Participants foresaw only a gradual improvement in 
labor market conditions in 2010 and 2011, leaving the 
unemployment rate at the end of 2011 well above the 
level they viewed as its longer-run sustainable rate. Par-
ticipants projected low inﬂ  ation this year. For 2010 and 
2011, the central tendencies of the participants’ inﬂ  ation 
Table 1.  Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents, June 2009
Percent
Change in real GDP ................................  -1.5 to -1.0  2.1 to 3.3  3.8 to 4.6  2.5 to 2.7  -1.6 to -0.6  0.8 to 4.0  2.3 to 5.0  2.4 to 2.8
  April projection ...................................  -2.0 to -1.3  2.0 to 3.0  3.5 to 4.8  2.5 to 2.7  -2.5 to -0.5  1.5 to 4.0  2.3 to 5.0  2.4 to 3.0
Unemployment rate  .................................  9.8 to 10.1  9.5 to 9.8  8.4 to 8.8  4.8 to 5.0  9.7 to 10.5  8.5 to 10.6  6.8 to 9.2  4.5 to 6.0
  April projection ...................................  9.2 to 9.6  9.0 to 9.5  7.7 to 8.5  4.8 to 5.0  9.1 to 10.0  8.0 to 9.6  6.5 to 9.0  4.5 to 5.3
PCE inﬂ  ation ...........................................  1.0 to 1.4  1.2 to 1.8  1.1 to 2.0  1.7 to 2.0  1.0 to 1.8  0.9 to 2.0  0.5 to 2.5  1.5 to 2.1 
  April projection ...................................  0.6 to 0.9  1.0 to 1.6  1.0 to 1.9  1.7 to 2.0  -0.5 to 1.2  0.7 to 2.0  0.5 to 2.5  1.5 to 2.0   
Core PCE inﬂ  ation3 .................................  1.3 to 1.6  1.0 to 1.5  0.9 to 1.7    1.2 to 2.0  0.5 to 2.0  0.2 to 2.5
  April projection ...................................  1.0 to 1.5  0.7 to 1.3  0.8 to 1.6    0.7 to 1.6  0.5 to 2.0  0.2 to 2.5 
  2009  2010  2011  Longer run  2009  2010  2011  Longer run
 Central  tendency1   Range2
Variable
 N OTE:  Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and in 
inﬂ  ation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of 
the year indicated. PCE inﬂ  ation and core PCE inﬂ  ation are the percentage rates 
of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expendi-
tures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections 
for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in 
the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant’s projections are based 
on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections 
represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would 
be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence 
of further shocks to the economy. The April projections were made 
in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on 
April 28–29, 2009. 
1.  The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections 
for each variable in each year.
2.  The range for a variable in a given year consists of all participants’ projec-
tions, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.











Figure 1. Central tendencies and ranges of economic projections, 2009–11 and over the longer run
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forecasts pointed to fairly stable inﬂ  ation that would be 
modestly below most participants’ estimates of the rate 
consistent with the dual objectives; however, the diver-
gence of participants’ views about the inﬂ  ation outlook 
remained wide. Most participants indicated that they 
expected the economy to take ﬁ  ve or six years to con-
verge to a longer-run path characterized by a sustain-
able rate of output growth and by rates of unemploy-
ment and inﬂ  ation consistent with the Federal Reserve’s 
dual objectives, but several said full convergence would 
take longer. In contrast to recent projections, a majority 
of participants perceived the risks to growth as roughly 
balanced, although several still viewed those risks as 
tilted to the downside. Most participants saw the risks 
surrounding their inﬂ  ation outlook as roughly balanced, 
and fewer participants than in April characterized those 
risks as skewed to the downside. With few exceptions, 
participants judged that the projections for economic 
activity and inﬂ  ation remained subject to a degree of 
uncertainty exceeding historical norms.
The Outlook
Participants’ projections for the change in real GDP in 
2009 had a central tendency of negative 1.5 percent to 
negative 1.0 percent, somewhat above the central ten-
dency of negative 2.0 percent to negative 1.3 percent 
for their April projections. Participants noted that the 
data received between the April and June FOMC meet-
ings pointed to a somewhat smaller decline in output 
during the ﬁ  rst half of the year than they had anticipated 
at the time of the April meeting. Moreover, participants 
saw additional indications that the economic downturn 
in the United States and worldwide was moderating in 
the second quarter, and they continued to expect that 
sales and production would begin to recover gradually 
during the second half of the year, reﬂ  ecting the effects 
of monetary and ﬁ  scal stimulus, measures to support 
credit markets, and diminishing ﬁ  nancial stresses. As 
reasons for marking up their projections for near-term 
economic activity, participants pointed to a further 
improvement in ﬁ  nancial conditions during the inter-
meeting period, signs of stabilization in consumer 
spending, and tentative indications of a leveling out of 
activity in the housing sector. In addition, they observed 
that aggressive inventory reductions during the ﬁ  rst 
half of this year appeared to have left ﬁ  rms’ stocks in 
better balance with sales, suggesting that production is 
likely to increase as sales stabilize and then start to turn 
up later this year. Participants expected, however, that 
recoveries in consumer spending and residential invest-
ment initially would be damped by further deterioration 
in labor markets, the continued repair of household 
balance sheets, persistently tight credit conditions, 
and still-weak housing demand. They also anticipated 
that very low capacity utilization, sluggish growth in 
sales, uncertainty about the economic environment, 
and a continued elevated cost and limited availability 
of ﬁ  nancing would contribute to continued weakness in 
business ﬁ  xed investment this year. Some participants 
noted that weak economic conditions in other countries 
probably would hold down growth in U.S. exports. 
A number of participants also saw recent increases in 
some long-term interest rates and in oil prices as factors 
that could damp a near-term economic recovery.
  Looking further ahead, participants’ projections for 
real GDP growth in 2010 and 2011 were not materially 
different from those provided in April. The projections 
for growth in 2010 had a central tendency of 2.1 to 
3.3 percent, and those for 2011 had a central tendency 
of 3.8 to 4.6 percent. Participants generally expected 
that household ﬁ  nancial positions would improve only 
gradually and that strains in credit markets and in the 
banking system would ebb slowly; hence, the pace of 
recovery would continue to be damped in 2010. But 
they anticipated that the upturn would strengthen in 
late 2010 and in 2011 to a pace exceeding the growth 
rate of potential GDP. Participants noted several factors 
contributing to this pickup, including accommoda-
tive monetary policy, ﬁ  scal stimulus, and continued 
improvement in ﬁ  nancial conditions and household 
balance sheets. Beyond 2011, they expected that out-
put growth would remain above that of potential GDP 
for a time, leading to a gradual elimination of slack in 
resource utilization. Over the longer run, most partici-
pants expected that, without further shocks, real GDP 
growth eventually would converge to a rate of 2.5 to 
2.7 percent per year, reﬂ  ecting longer-term trends in the 
growth of productivity and the labor force.
  Even though participants raised their output growth 
forecasts, they also moved up their unemployment 
rate projections and continued to anticipate that labor 
market conditions would deteriorate further over the 
remainder of the year. Their projections for the aver-
age unemployment rate during the fourth quarter of 
2009 had a central tendency of 9.8 to 10.1 percent, 
about ½ percentage point above the central tendency of 
their April projections and noticeably higher than the 
actual unemployment rate of 9.4 percent in May—the 
latest reading available at the time of the June FOMC 
meeting. All participants raised their forecasts of the 
unemployment rate at the end of this year, reﬂ  ect-
ing the sharper-than-expected rise in unemployment 
that occurred over the intermeeting period. With little 
material change in projected output growth in 2010 42  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   July 2009
and 2011, participants still expected unemployment 
to decline in those years, but the projected unemploy-
ment rate in each year was about ½ percentage point 
above the April forecasts, reﬂ  ecting the higher starting 
point of the projections. Most participants anticipated 
that output growth next year would not substantially 
exceed its longer-run sustainable rate and hence that 
the unemployment rate would decline only modestly in 
2010; some also pointed to frictions associated with the 
reallocation of labor from shrinking economic sectors 
to expanding sectors as likely to restrain progress in 
reducing unemployment. The central tendency of 
the unemployment rate at the end of 2010 was 9.5 to 
9.8 percent. With output growth and job creation gener-
ally projected to pick up appreciably in 2011, partici-
pants anticipated that joblessness would decline more 
noticeably, as evident from the central tendency of 8.4 
to 8.8 percent for their projections of the unemploy-
ment rate in the fourth quarter of 2011. They expected 
that the unemployment rate would decline considerably 
further in subsequent years as it moved back toward its 
longer-run sustainable level, which most participants 
still saw as between 4.8 and 5.0 percent; however, a 
few participants raised their estimates of the longer-run 
unemployment rate.
  The central tendency of participants’ projections for 
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inﬂ  ation in 
2009 was 1.0 to 1.4 percent, about ½ percentage point 
above the central tendency of their April projections. 
Participants noted that higher-than-expected inﬂ  ation 
data over the intermeeting period and the anticipated 
inﬂ  uence of higher oil and commodity prices on con-
sumer prices were factors contributing to the increase in 
their inﬂ  ation forecasts. Looking beyond this year, par-
ticipants’ projections for total PCE inﬂ  ation had central 
tendencies of 1.2 to 1.8 percent for 2010 and 1.1 to 
2.0 percent for 2011, modestly higher than the central 
tendencies from the April projections. Reﬂ  ecting the 
large increases in energy prices over the intermeet-
ing period, the forecasts for core PCE inﬂ  ation (which 
excludes the direct effects of movements in food and 
energy prices) in 2009 were raised by less than the pro-
jections for total PCE inﬂ  ation, while the forecasts for 
core and total PCE inﬂ  ation in 2010 and 2011 increased 
by similar amounts. The central tendency of projections 
for core inﬂ  ation in 2009 was 1.3 to 1.6 percent; those 
for 2010 and 2011 were 1.0 to 1.5 percent and 0.9 to 
1.7 percent, respectively. Most participants expected 
that sizable economic slack would continue to damp 
inﬂ  ation pressures for the next few years and hence 
that total PCE inﬂ  ation in 2011 would still be below 
their assessments of its appropriate longer-run level. 
Some thought that such slack would generate a decline 
in inﬂ  ation over the next few years. Most, however, 
projected that, as the economy recovers, inﬂ  ation would 
increase gradually and move closer to their individual 
assessments of the measured rate of inﬂ  ation consistent 
with the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate for maximum 
employment and price stability. Several participants, 
noting that the public’s longer-run inﬂ  ation expectations 
had not changed appreciably, expected that inﬂ  ation 
would return more promptly to levels consistent with 
their judgments about longer-run inﬂ  ation than these 
participants had projected in April. A few participants 
also anticipated that projected inﬂ  ation in 2011 would 
be modestly above their longer-run inﬂ  ation projections 
because of the possible effects of very low short-term 
interest rates and of the large expansion of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet on the public’s inﬂ  ation expec-
tations. Overall, the range of participants’ projections of 
inﬂ  ation in 2011 remained quite wide.
  As in April, the central tendency of projections of 
the longer-run inﬂ  ation rate was 1.7 to 2.0 percent. 
Most participants judged that a longer-run PCE inﬂ  ation 
rate of 2 percent would be consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s dual mandate; others indicated that inﬂ  ation 
of 1½ percent or 1¾ percent would be appropriate. 
Modestly positive longer-run inﬂ  ation would allow the 
Committee to stimulate economic activity and support 
employment by setting the federal funds rate temporar-
ily below the inﬂ  ation rate when the economy suffers a 
large negative shock to demands for goods and 
services.
Uncertainty and Risks
In contrast to the participants’ views over the past sev-
eral quarters, in June a majority of participants saw the 
risks to their projections for real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate as broadly balanced. In explaining 
why they perceived a reduction in downside risks to 
the outlook, these participants pointed to the tentative 
signs of economic stabilization, indications of some 
effectiveness of monetary and ﬁ  scal policy actions, and 
improvements in ﬁ  nancial conditions. In contrast, sev-
eral participants still saw the risks to their GDP growth 
forecasts as skewed to the downside and the associated 
risks to unemployment as skewed to the upside. Almost 
all participants shared the judgment that their projec-
tions of future economic activity and unemployment 
continued to be subject to greater-than-average uncer-
tainty.17 Many participants again high-lighted the still-
17.  Table 2 provides estimates of forecast uncertainty for the 
change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, and total consumer price 
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considerable uncertainty about the future course of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and the risk that a resurgence of ﬁ  nan-
cial turmoil could adversely impact the real economy. 
In addition, some noted the difﬁ  culty in gauging the 
macroeconomic effects of the credit-easing policies that 
have been employed by the Federal Reserve and other 
central banks, given the limited experience with such 
tools.
  Most participants judged the risks to the inﬂ  ation 
outlook as roughly balanced, with the number doing 
so higher than in April. A few participants continued 
to view these risks as skewed to the downside, and one 
saw the inﬂ  ation risks as tilted to the upside. Some par-
ticipants noted the risk that inﬂ  ation expectations might 
drift downward in response to persistently low inﬂ  ation 
outcomes and continued signiﬁ  cant slack in resource 
utilization. Several participants pointed to the possibil-
ity of an upward shift in expected and actual inﬂ  ation if 
the stimulative monetary policy measures and the atten-
dant expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
were not unwound in a timely fashion as the economy 
recovers. Most participants again saw the uncertainty 
surrounding their inﬂ  ation projections as exceeding his-
torical norms.
Diversity of Views
Figures 2.A and 2.B provide further details on the diver-
sity of participants’ views regarding likely outcomes 
mary, the box titled “Forecast Uncertainty” discusses the sources and 
interpretation of uncertainty in economic forecasts and explains the 
approach used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending partici-
pants’ projections.
for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate in 
2009, 2010, 2011, and over the longer run. The disper-
sion in participants’ June projections for the next three 
years reﬂ  ects, among other factors, the diversity of their 
assessments regarding the effects of ﬁ  scal stimulus and 
nontraditional monetary policy actions as well as the 
likely pace of improvement in ﬁ  nancial conditions. For 
real GDP growth, the distribution of projections for 
2009 narrowed and shifted slightly higher, reﬂ  ecting 
the somewhat better-than-expected data received dur-
ing the intermeeting period. The distributions for 2010 
and 2011 changed little. For the unemployment rate, the 
surprisingly large increases in unemployment reported 
during the intermeeting period prompted an upward 
shift in the distribution. Because of the persistence 
exhibited in many of the unemployment forecasts, there 
were similar upward shifts in the distributions for 2010 
and 2011. The dispersion of these forecasts for all three 
years was roughly similar to that of April. The distribu-
tion of participants’ projections of longer-run real GDP 
growth was about unchanged. A few participants raised 
their longer-run projections of the unemployment rate,  
widening the dispersion of these estimates, as they 
incorporated the effects of unexpectedly high recent 
unemployment data and of the reallocation of labor 
from declining sectors to expanding ones. The disper-
sion in participants’ longer-run projections reﬂ  ected 
differences in their estimates regarding the sustainable 
rates of output growth and unemployment to which the 
economy would converge under appropriate monetary 
policy and in the absence of any further shocks.
  Figures 2.C and 2.D provide corresponding informa-
tion about the diversity of participants’ views regarding 
the inﬂ  ation outlook. The distribution of the projections 
for total and core PCE inﬂ  ation in 2009 moved upward, 
reﬂ  ecting the higher inﬂ  ation data released over the 
intermeeting period, while distributions for the projec-
tions in 2010 and 2011 did not change signiﬁ  cantly. 
The dispersion in participants’ projections for total and 
core PCE inﬂ  ation for 2009, 2010, and 2011 illustrates 
their varying assessments of the effects on inﬂ  ation and 
inﬂ  ation expectations of persistent economic slack as 
well as of the recent expansion of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet. These varying assessments are especially 
evident in the wide dispersion of inﬂ  ation projections 
for 2011. In contrast, the tight distribution of partici-
pants’ projections for longer-run inﬂ  ation illustrates 
their substantial agreement about the measured rate 
of inﬂ  ation that is most consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum employment and 
stable prices.
Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges
Percentage points
Change in real GDP1 .........................................  ±1.0  ±1.5  ±1.6
Unemployment rate1.......................................... ±0.4  ±0.8  ±1.0 
Total consumer prices2 ......................................  ±0.9  ±1.0  ±1.0
NOTE:  Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the root mean squared 
error of projections for 1989 through 2008 that were released in the summer 
by various private and government forecasters. As described in the box titled 
“Forecast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is about a 70 percent 
probability that actual outcomes for real GDP, unemployment, and consumer 
prices will be in ranges implied by the average size of projection errors made in 
the past. Further information is in David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip (2007), 
“Gauging the Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook from Historical Forecasting 
Errors,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-60 (Washington: Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November). 
1. For  deﬁ  nitions, refer to general note in table 1.
2.  Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure that has 
been most widely used in government and private economic forecasts. Projection 
is percent change, fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the 
year indicated. 
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The economic projections provided by the 
members of the Board of Governors and the 
presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks inform 
discussions of monetary policy among policy-
makers and can aid public understanding of the 
basis for policy actions. Considerable uncer-
tainty attends these projections, however. The 
economic and statistical models and relation-
ships used to help produce economic forecasts 
are necessarily imperfect descriptions of the real 
world. And the future path of the economy can 
be affected by myriad unforeseen developments 
and events. Thus, in setting the stance of mon-
etary policy, participants consider not only what 
appears to be the most likely economic outcome 
as embodied in their projections, but also the 
range of alternative possibilities, the likelihood 
of their occurring, and the potential costs to the 
economy should they occur.
  Table 2 summarizes the average historical 
accuracy of a range of forecasts, including those 
reported in past Monetary Policy Reports and 
those prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff 
in advance of meetings of the Federal Open 
Market Committee. The projection error ranges 
shown in the table illustrate the considerable 
uncertainty associated with economic forecasts. 
For example, suppose a participant projects that 
real gross domestic product (GDP) and total 
consumer prices will rise steadily at annual rates 
of, respectively, 3 percent and 2 percent. If the 
uncertainty attending those projections is simi-
lar to that experienced in the past and the risks 
around the projections are broadly balanced, 
the numbers reported in table 2 would imply a 
probability of about 70 percent that actual GDP 
would expand within a range of 2.0 to 4.0 per-
cent in the current year, 1.5 to 4.5 percent in 
the second year, and 1.4 to 4.6 percent in the 
third year. The corresponding 70 percent confi-
dence intervals for overall inflation would be 
1.1 to 2.9 percent in the current year and 1.0 
to 3.0 percent in the second and third years.
  Because current conditions may differ from 
those that prevailed, on average, over history, 
participants provide judgments as to whether the 
uncertainty attached to their projections of each 
variable is greater than, smaller than, or broadly 
similar to typical levels of forecast uncertainty 
in the past as shown in table 2. Participants also 
provide judgments as to whether the risks to 
their projections are weighted to the upside, are 
weighted to the downside, or are broadly bal-
anced. That is, participants judge whether each 
variable is more likely to be above or below 
their projections of the most likely outcome. 
These judgments about the uncertainty and the 
risks attending each participant’s projections are 
distinct from the diversity of participants’ views 
about the most likely outcomes. Forecast uncer-
tainty is concerned with the risks associated with 
a particular projection rather than with diver-
gences across a number of different projections.
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Abbreviations
ABCP  asset-backed commercial paper
ABS asset-backed  securities
AIG  American International Group, Inc.
BHC  bank holding company
BOJ  Bank of Japan
CAP Capital  Assistance  Program
CDS  credit default swap
C&I  commercial and industrial
CMBS  commercial mortgage-backed securities
CP   commercial  paper
CPFF  Commercial Paper Funding Facility
CPH  compensation per hour
CPP  Capital Purchase Program
CRE  commercial real estate
DPI  disposable personal income
ECB  European Central Bank
ECI  employment cost index 
FDIC  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FOMC  Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee
GDP  gross domestic product
GSE government-sponsored  enterprise
IRA  individual retirement account
Libor  London interbank offered rate
LLC  limited liability company
MBS mortgage-backed  securities
NIPA  national income and product accounts
NOW  negotiable order of withdrawal
OCC Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency
OIS  overnight index swap 
OTTI other-than-temporary  impairment
PCE  personal consumption expenditures
PPIP  Public-Private Investment Program
SCAP  Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
SPV  special purpose vehicle
TAF Term  Auction  Facility
TALF  Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
TIPS Treasury  inﬂ  ation-protected securities
VRDO  variable-rate demand obligation
WTI West  Texas  intermediate